EUROPE
Five Years After
HELSINKI

Yuri KASHLEV

THE SOVIET VIEWPOINT

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INTRODUCTION

It has been established that out of the 14,500 wars experienced by mankind over the past 55 centuries about half were fought in Europe. The continent is literally drenched in blood. The wars of the 17th century claimed 3.3 million lives, of the 19th century, 6 million and of the 20th century, more than 50 million lives. Those who have travelled in various parts of the world would have noticed that there are more war memorials in Europe than in any other region of the world.

It had seemed for centuries that wars were inevitable and unavoidable. Herodotus said that war was the father of everything and master of all. The motto of ancient Rome was *Si vis pacem, para bellum* ("Let him who desires peace prepare for war"). And for thousands of years the ruling classes have been guided by it, stockpiling mountains of arms and preparing for and unleashing new wars.

But now Europe has been living in peace for 35 years. Never before has history granted such a long period without bloodshed or cannon boom to the long-suffering continent.

It has become possible to preserve peace in Europe first of all thanks to the might and prestige of the Soviet Union, of the whole socialist community and its active peace policy, and to socialism's turning into an

international force, a process foreseen by Lenin, capable of exerting a decisive influence on world politics. It was in Europe, where socialist states had been developing at an intensive pace, that a basic, major change occurred for the first time in the correlation of forces between the two socio-economic systems of our time, socialism and capitalism, in favour of socialism and its foreign policy, bringing peace and security to the nations.

A new stage in international relations, marked by a relaxation of tension, has set in. In the West, the first to respond to this policy proposed by the Soviet Union were the realistically-minded leaders of France, the Federal Republic of Germany, and a number of other Western European states. As General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev, has observed:

"The changes for the better in the world, which have become especially appreciable in the 1970s, we refer to as international detente. These changes are tangible and specific. They consist in the recognition and enactment in international documents of a form of code of rules for honest and fair relations between countries, which erects a legal and moral-political barrier against those given to military gambles. They consist in the achievement of the first agreements — modest though they may be for the moment — for blocking some of the channels of the arms race. They consist of a whole system of agreements covering many areas of peaceful co-operation between states having different social systems.

"The changes for the better are most conspicuous in Europe, where good-neighbourly relations, mutual understanding and the nations' mutual interest in, and respect for, one another are gaining in strength.

We prize this achievement, and consider it our duty to safeguard and consolidate it in every way".

The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, held on the initiative of the Soviet Union and its allies, became a genuine historic landmark. The Conference which met in Helsinki in 1975 introduced new important elements into detente. It cemented the political foundation of detente by endorsing the generally recognized principles of inter-state relations, mapped out an extensive programme of co-operation in trade, economic and cultural relations, set up a mechanism for subsequent collective negotiations, and turned detente into a multilateral process by drawing practically all the European countries into it.

The present author took part in drafting the text of the Final Act (as a member of the Soviet delegation at the Geneva stage of the European Conference) and in the practical implementation of the Helsinki accords, in particular, in the field of cultural ties and information, and also attended the Belgrade meeting of representatives of 35 states, participants in the European Conference.

Naturally, each of these stages had specific features of its own. The summit forum in the Finnish capital came on a wave of optimism following notable progress in the cause of detente in the mid-1970s, it was a culmination of this process. In the years after the Helsinki Conference many-sided activities were carried out to consolidate the political principles of the Final Act in European relations, to implement concrete agreements in the fields of trade, economic, scientific, cultural and information ties and to promote trust among nations.

Later, however, the international climate began to change. The achievements of detente had found their most vivid expression in the success of the European

Conference and the conclusion of the first Soviet-US Treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms (SALT-1). But they aroused fear in the camp of the extreme reactionaries in the USA since they posed a threat to the profits of the military-industrial complex which ran into thousands of millions of dollars. A noisy campaign against detente was unleashed. The arms race within the framework of NATO was stepped up and massive attempts were launched to interfere in the internal affairs of the socialist countries and revive the cold war.

In this period of acute confrontation between the forces working for and against detente, the benefits brought to Europe by the process started in Helsinki became particularly apparent. Indeed, an unprecedented number of treaties and agreements were concluded between socialist and capitalist countries in the past five years. All of them expressed support for the political principles of the Helsinki Final Act. And these principles enabled a number of states to find solutions to many complex problems left over from World War II.

Over the past five years the scope of trade and economic co-operation in Europe has grown immensely. Scientific, technological and cultural ties as well as contacts between people became more active.

One of the important agreements reached at the European Conference concerns advance notification of major military exercises by each side. This agreement has been successfully implemented.

The mechanism of multilateral European negotiations envisaged by the Final Act continues to function. The Belgrade Meeting of 33 European countries, the USA and Canada, was on the whole a success despite many difficulties. There have been useful meetings of experts in various fields in Switzerland, Malta and the Federal Republic of Germany. An all-European high-level conference on environmental protection was held in the autumn of 1979 and the All-European Scientific Forum in the spring of 1980. Preparations are well under way for another European meeting of 35 countries to be held in Madrid in late 1980.

On the whole the process that started in Helsinki has become a part of European life. It has consolidated European co-operation in spheres of vital importance for the nations of this continent.

Regrettably, no progress has been made over those years in the sphere of military detente, on the question of disarmament in Europe. Moreover, the situation in this field has become more complex because of the militarist policy pursued by Washington and NATO. We shall discuss the causes of this development later.

It is five years now since the historic Final Act of the European Conference was signed. On this occasion let us recall how European detente got under way and what were the main factors that made this policy a reality of our time. Let us return to the conference halls of Geneva, Helsinki and Belgrade and then assess what has been done in recent years to implement the agreements of the European Conference, the achievements and difficulties involved in this work, and consider the tasks of the next European forum due to be held in Madrid.

I. THE BEGINNING OF DETENTE

The idea of setting up a multilateral mechanism of security and co-operation in Europe and working out generally acceptable principles of relations among countries dates back to ancient times. Yet practical steps in this direction were taken only when the world's first socialist country, the Soviet Union, emerged on the continent. Thus it is the USSR which in the 1930s took vigorous actions aimed at establishing a collective security system on the continent and preventing aggression, and which since the mid-1950s has advanced numerous proposals on this score, including the proposal to hold a European Conference.

The Western powers did not want to consider these proposals seriously in those years. They believed that their economic and military superiority over socialism was unalterable and that therefore they could always direct the course of European life in accordance with their own plans and ambitions, resorting to the mailed fist if necessary.

Much time had passed before the situation changed. And here once again we return to the problem of the correlation of forces or, to be more exact, to the change in this key factor of international relations which occurred in the 1960s and opened the way to detente.

Understandably, the correlation of world forces is a

complex and many-sided question, involving political, economic, military and other factors. What is more, the new correlation did not appear within a year or two, but had taken shape over a prolonged period. Nevertheless, let us try to identify some of the main factors facilitating this process in order to better understand why detente began precisely in Europe and precisely in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The most important of the factors was the state of the economy in the opposing socio-political systems. The 1960s were a period of immense economic achievements on the part of the socialist countries: the Soviet Union had increased its economic potential several times over while the Eastern European countries, having laid the foundations of socialism, started to build a developed socialist society. As the socialist system became more mature, it revealed more fully the advantages of its economic and socio-political structure and made possible a high rate of economic and cultural development. Between 1951 and 1973 Bulgaria increased its gross output 15 times, Czechoslovakia 5.9 times, Hungary and the German Democratic Republic 6.2 times, Poland 9.4 times, Romania 16 times, and the USSR 8.8 times.

Already in the 1960s the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance exceeded the Common Market, the biggest economic association of the capitalist world, in gross output and also of course in the rate of growth. While accounting for 18 per cent of the world territory and just 10 per cent of the world population, the CMEA countries produced about one third of world industrial output by the end of the 1960s as compared to 10.4 per cent in 1946.

All that took place against the background of major economic difficulties in the capitalist world. In the 1960s, inflation, unemployment, the monetary and

energy crises led to recessions in the capitalist economy. The economic positions of the United States grew weaker. Whereas in 1948 the USA accounted for 55.8 per cent of world capitalist production and 23.4 per cent of world capitalist exports, the figures dropped to 40.4 and 14 per cent respectively by the late 1970s. Meanwhile, the figures for Western European exports and industrial production rose to 34.3 and 50 per cent. Inter-imperialist antagonisms and competition between US, Western European and Japanese monopolies became more acute. Western Europe, with its growing economic potential, began to show some degree of independence in its foreign policy for the first time in postwar years. In pursuing their specific economic interests which did not always coincide with US interests, such European capitalist countries as France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, Austria and several others began to expand cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist countries. This, in turn, also facilitated the transition to detente.

Alongside of socio-economic progress of world socialism, important changes were also taking place in yet another field. It is no secret that the defence potential of a country depends on the level of its economic development. And vital, qualitative changes occurred in that sphere, too, in the 1960s. Yuri Gagarin's pioneer space flight in 1961 showed the world the USSR's superiority in rocketry. Soviet nuclear arms tests in the late 1950s and early 1960s also had a sobering effect on the leaders of the imperialist states. The West's loss of military superiority compelled it to enter into serious talks with the USSR.

Furthermore, a process of worldwide significance began in the 1960s: the collapse of the colonial system in Asia. More than 90 new states appeared on the

world political map. Decolonization seriously affected the alignment of world forces as tens of young independent states in Asia, Africa and Latin America, formerly the hinterland of world capitalism, objectively became allies of world socialism on the international scene.

Another feature of the 1960s deserves special mention. In those years world public opinion began to press for an easing of international tension and recognition of the principle of peaceful coexistence. The struggle for peace gained momentum as the race in nuclear missiles continued endangering the very existence of whole nations. Realization of this danger undoubtedly broadened the scope of the movement. Many political and social forces in other countries, millions of people, especially in Western Europe with its traditionally highly organized peace movement, became allies of the socialist countries in the struggle for detente.

Communists played a most active role in that movement. The International Meetings of Communist and Workers' Parties held in 1960 and 1969 declared the struggle for peaceful coexistence and reducing world tension to be one of the main objectives of the international communist and working class movement. All that helped the Soviet Union, the whole socialist community, to bring about a change in international relations in favour of detente.

Under the impact of all these factors, and first of all of the increased might and prestige of the USSR, the first elements of realism began to appear in the views of the ruling circles of Western European countries. They found expression in the pursuit of a policy based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and constructive relations with the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries. This trend was opposed

by the United States which sought to retain political leadership over Western Europe through NATO. On the other hand, there was a growing mood in a number of capitalist countries in favour of a policy that was more independent of NATO, a policy which would serve their national interests. Under those circumstances France, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, withdrew from the NATO military organization and adopted a policy of co-operation with the Soviet Union.

President de Gaulle's visit to the Soviet Union in 1966 became a landmark on the road to detente in Europe. The Soviet-French Declaration signed in the Kremlin at that time pointed out that detente was the first and a necessary stage in the development of normal relations among the European countries regardless of their political system. Both countries agreed to regard as their objective the normalization and, later, gradual improvement of relations among all European countries based on respect for the independence of each of them and non-interference in one another's domestic affairs.

The visit to the USSR by de Gaulle's successor, President Georges Pompidou in 1970, confirmed once again that the policy conducted by the Soviet Union and France aimed at strengthening bilateral co-operation was both viable and effective. During the visit the two countries affirmed their determination to expand and deepen their co-operation and to promote detente and security in Europe.

It is worth recalling that Soviet-French rapprochement was at first bitterly resented in the West. It came under attack from most of the NATO countries. In the United States there were calls for punishing France for her "apostasy" while in Britain newspapers carried cartoons showing the "Russian bear" straining the

French Marianne to his breast. Generals at NATO headquarters in Brussels were furious and accused France of creating a breach in the Western united anti-Soviet front.

However, Soviet-French co-operation continued to expand, paving the road to detente for the whole of Europe.

The second half of the 1960s was marked by important changes in the Federal Republic of Germany. It was a time of political crisis for those forces in the Republic which had for two decades oriented their foreign policy toward revenge, access to nuclear arms and non-recognition of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries foiled NATO plans to give the militarists of Federal Germany access to nuclear weapons. The policy of isolating the German Democratic Republic had also failed to work. The GDR was winning ever broader international recognition with every passing year. The increased activity of the neo-Nazis aroused much concern in many quarters, including the progressive public in Federal Germany itself.

In those circumstances voters showed their disapproval of the revenge-seeking policy of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU) in the general elections of 1969, and most of the votes went to the coalition of the Social Democrats and Free Democrats. The government formed by Chancellor Willy Brandt adopted a more realistic position in the sphere of international affairs.

August 12, 1970 became a historical landmark in the shaping of the policy of detente. On that day a treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany was signed in Moscow, opening a new chapter in their relations. The world public regarded it

as a milestone in the political development of Europe and the world.

The significance of the Moscow Treaty consisted in that it recognized the inviolability of frontiers on the continent as the most important factor of European security. The two sides stated that they had no territorial claims against anyone and would make no such claims in the future. They declared that they had no intention of resorting to the use or threat of force against each other and promised to shape their policies in conformity with the interests of peace, strictly observe the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their present borders and regard these borders, including Poland's border along the Oder-Neisse line and the border between the FRG and the GDR, as inviolable both at present and in the future.

Shortly afterwards, in December 1970, a treaty between federal Germany and the Polish People's Republic was signed in Warsaw. These treaties, based on recognition of the political and territorial realities of postwar Europe, cleared the way for further steps towards easing tension in the 1970s.

Better Soviet-French and Soviet-West German relations became the most important factor of international politics in the second half of the 1960s, a factor which had a positive impact on the whole fabric of international relations in Europe. Relations between the USSR and Italy had also improved. Their trade and economic contacts broadened. Italy was the first Common Market country to sign a long-term trade agreement (for 1966-1969) with the Soviet Union.

Relations also improved in the late 1960's between the Soviet Union and such countries as Finland, Austria, Sweden and other European nations.

The United States stood aloof from detente in

Europe, but objectively it meant that it opposed it. Washington had tried to prevent a rapprochement between France and the Soviet Union; it encouraged the anti-Soviet, revenge-seeking ambitions of the CDU/CSU ruling coalition in the FRG, and launched a propaganda drive to create military hysteria in Europe.

Aggressive circles continued to set the pace in US foreign policy. They were for preserving and carrying on the cold war and suppressing national liberation movements by force of arms. Relations between the USSR and the USA in the 1964-1970 period took a turn for the worse. And this was largely the fault of those aggressive forces, and especially as a result of the US invasion of Vietnam and support for Israeli aggression against Arab countries.

However, US imperialism could not but take into account the Soviet Union's growing economic and defence potential and was compelled to reconcile itself to a number of steps designed to reduce tension and promote co-operation with the USSR. Between 1967 and 1968 the two countries worked to co-ordinate their positions in line with preparations for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Soviet-US Consular Convention went into force in 1968. Some progress was also made in developing cultural ties and organizing exchange of students between the two countries, etc.

Thus towards the end of the 1960s a new correlation of forces between socialism and capitalism took shape. The struggle to reduce world tension became more active. The leaders of France, Federal Germany and other Western European countries and, later, the United States, displayed elements of realism in their foreign policies. All that enabled the Soviet Union in

the early 1970s to put forward an extensive programme for strengthening peace and security.

What new features characterized the policy of detente in the first half of the 1970s as compared with the previous period? First, co-operation between the USSR and the other socialist community countries, on the one hand, and France and FRG, on the other, was raised to a new, higher level. Relations between the socialist countries and other Western European states also improved. Second, the United States came to take part in the process of detente. Third, the sphere of Soviet-US talks was extended to the problem of scaling down the strategic arms race, and the first important results were achieved in that field. Fourth, trade, economic and cultural links began to play a greater role in relations between socialist and capitalist countries. And, fifth, it was in those years that conditions arose for holding a European conference.

These new features of international relations made the first half of the 1970s a period of growth of detente.

One of the important steps towards easing tension in Europe and improving the international climate as a whole was the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin by the USSR, the USA, Great Britain and France on September 3, 1971. Its key point is the commitment of the signatories to help remove tension and prevent the rise of complications in the West Berlin area. The Agreement clearly stated that the city was not part of the Federal Republic of Germany and would not be governed by it in the future. This Agreement, later supplemented by a number of documents on concrete issues involving the GDR, the FRG and West Berlin, marked an extremely important development in the effort to eliminate a centre of confrontation in the heart of Europe.

Other constructive talks and measures followed shortly afterwards. Leonid Brezhnev and Chancellor Willy Brandt met in Oreanda (1971). A Treaty on the Bases of Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany was signed (1972), which said that relations between the two countries would develop on the basis of peaceful coexistence. The Parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany ratified the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties (1972). Both German states were admitted to the United Nations (1973). A Treaty between Czechoslovakia and the FRG was signed (1973), and relations between other socialist countries and the FRG were normalized.

The historic turn for new, better relations between the USSR and the FRG, relations that are normal for peacetime, was consolidated during Leonid Brezhnev's visit to the FRG in 1973. A number of documents were signed during the visit, including a joint Soviet-West German statement, a 10-year Agreement on the Development of Economic, Industrial and Technical Co-operation, and an agreement on cultural co-operation. They raised to a new level mutual understanding and businesslike co-operation between the USSR and the FRG and created the prerequisites for further progress of detente in Europe.

Normalization of political relations between the USSR and the FRG cleared the way for rapid growth of their trade, economic, scientific and technical ties. Between 1970 and 1974 trade turnover between the two countries increased more than fourfold to exceed 2.2 thousand million roubles. Large commercial transactions were concluded whereby the USSR would supply about 174 thousand million cubic metres of natural gas to the FRG before the year 2000 and the

FRG would deliver large-diameter pipes to the Soviet Union. Gradually Soviet-West German co-operation came to cover such fields as engineering, the petrochemical and non-ferrous metals industries, the development of new mineral deposits, etc.

Relations between the USSR and France were also raised to a new level in the first half of the 1970s. Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France in 1971 at the invitation of President Georges Pompidou led to exceptionally important results. The Principles of Co-operation between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and France signed by the two leaders became one of the first documents in the history of relations between the Soviet Union and a major capitalist country to endorse peaceful coexistence as a basic principle governing mutual relations and to proclaim the easing of world tension as the aim of co-operation between the two states.

In the early 1970s the CPSU and the Soviet State sought ways of normalizing relations with the United States. Naturally, detente could not become worldwide without the participation of that most powerful capitalist state, nor could the key problems of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament have been resolved without it.

Changes in the correlation of forces in favour of the Soviet Union and the socialist community as a whole compelled the US leadership to establish broader contacts with the USSR. The Soviet-US summit in 1972 ended with the signing of a series of treaties and agreements, the most important of which was the Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. It laid the legal basis for the conclusion later of a number of agreements on concrete aspects of co-operation between the two countries. The document

says that the two sides "will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USSR and the USA are no obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in the internal affairs and mutual advantage." For the first time a President of the United States signed a document containing the term peaceful coexistence".

During the Soviet-US talks in Moscow the two countries for the first time reached agreement also on concrete steps to contain and limit the strategic arms race. They signed a Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems without any time limit, restricting the number of ABMs deployed by each side, and an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, for a term of five years.

At the same time agreements were also signed on co-operation in the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, in public health, science and engineering, and environmental protection.

In June 1973, Leonid Brezhnev paid a visit to the United States. During the visit the two sides signed nine more agreements including the historic Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War and the Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a document of major importance.

In all, about 20 bilateral agreements between the USSR and the USA were concluded in 1972-73, or more than in all the preceding years in which the two countries maintained diplomatic relations with each other.

As world tension reduced and detente became a dominant trend in international relations, the prerequisites were being created for convening a European conference on security and co-operation. Convocation of such a conference was one of the main foreign-policy objectives of the Soviet Union and of the entire socialist community in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

II. THE HISTORIC CONFERENCE IN HELSINKI

As far back as July 1966 a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty countries put forward and gave a concrete expression to the idea of holding a European Conference. A Declaration on the Strengthening of Peace and Security in Europe adopted at the meeting stated that a conference to discuss European security and co-operation would be a major landmark in the modern history of the continent.

Realistically-minded Western political figures were also beginning to recognize the need for collective approval of the important changes in Europe that had been recorded in bilateral agreements between the USSR and France, between the USSR and the FRG, and among other countries. The French newspaper *Le Monde Diplomatique* observed in October 1970 that after the signing of the treaty between the USSR and the FRG a European conference "was becoming a genuine political necessity" since the policy of detente and co-operation in Europe could be finalized only "within the framework of a general agreement on the basic principles of a security system in Europe, that is, through a congress of European nations."

So, thanks to the major positive changes in relations between the socialist and capitalist countries and the persevering efforts of the USSR and its allies, conditions had finally arisen for holding a European

conference. Finland played an active role in this effort. It took the initiative in arranging preparatory consultations in Helsinki for representatives of all the countries concerned to discuss matters connected with the projected conference.

Consultations at ambassadorial level were held in Helsinki from November 1972 to June 1973. The ambassadors approved the following agenda for the conference: 1) matters related to security in Europe; 2) co-operation in the fields of economy, science, technology and environmental protection; 3)co-operation in the humanitarian and other fields; 4)further steps to be taken after the conference. It was agreed that the conference would be held in three stages.

The first stage of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was held in Helsinki from July 3 to 7. It was attended by the Foreign Ministers of 33 European countries, the USA and Canada. Eight of them represented the European socialist countries, 15 the NATO countries and the remaining 12 were from capitalist countries not involved in military blocs.

The Ministers set out the views of their governments on the key questions of security and co-operation in Europe and decided on the order of the conference's further work.

The speech by USSR Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko aroused keen interest at the conference. In it he noted that from the point of view of the turn that had taken place towards strengthening peace and reducing tension the European Conference was in the mainstream of development of the world situation. "We want Europe to become a continent where aggression is ruled out from the life of its nations forever," Andrey Gromyko said, and "we hope that mutual confidence and understanding will make it possible to overcome the division of Europe into

military political groupings". Relations among all European states, he pointed out, should become relations of peaceful and mutually advantageous co-operation.

In his speech Andrey Gromyko devoted much attention to the prospects of trade, economic, scientific and technical co-operation in Europe as well as cultural exchanges, contacts between public organizations, young people and members of kindred professions. Such contacts must be aimed at strengthening trust among the European nations and promoting the ideals of peace, equality, and good-neighbourliness in international relations as well as eliminating the psychological consequences of the cold war and the practice of interfering in the domestic affairs of other nations.

The constructive approach of the socialist countries was evident not only from the statements of their Foreign Ministers. Their delegations tabled concrete drafts of documents on all the items of the agenda providing for broader co-operation among the participating states. For example, the German Democratic Republic and Hungary submitted the draft of a joint statement on the development of co-operation in the fields of economy, trade, science and technology, and environmental protection. Bulgaria and Poland tabled the draft of a document on developing cultural co-operation and contacts, and exchange of information. Czechoslovakia proposed the setting up of a consultative committee on security and co-operation in Europe.

Western representatives, however, immediately concentrated their attention on the third item of the agenda. They asserted that human contacts were the main condition for detente. This argument was contained in the speeches by the foreign ministers of the

FRG, France, Britain, the USA, and a number of other countries. The artificial emphasis on the "third basket" was also reflected in the fact that the West tabled 15 proposals on this item of the agenda at the first stage of the Conference and only two proposals on the first, key item (European security) and four proposals on the second item. This shift of emphasis, planned in advance by the Western participants, became even more pronounced at the second stage of the Conference, during the drafting of the Final Act.

The second stage opened in Geneva shortly after the first. It was an important and difficult phase which lasted, with intermissions, from September 1973 to July 1975. The main difficulty consisted in the fact that the problems facing the delegations of the participating countries were of a fundamentally new character. After a quarter of a century of confrontation they now tried to formulate principles on the basis of which a restructuring of relations on the European continent was to be effected. It is safe to say that it was the first ever collective experiment in history to work out a code of conduct and co-operation of states with different social systems in conditions of peaceful coexistence, and not in any one particular field, but in all the key areas of international relations — political, economic and cultural.

The entire work was carried out according to the consensus principle. This meant that not a single provision, not even a single word, was considered adopted if opposed even by one delegate. Although this rule often slowed down the pace of work because of the long search for "common denominators" and because of its abuse by some of the delegations, it did ensure a democratic procedure, equality and consideration of the interests of all countries without exception, big and small, socialist and capitalist.

The amount of work accomplished in Geneva over the two years is impressive. There were 2,500 official sessions of the various bodies of the Conference, to say nothing of the many thousands of unofficial sittings and bilateral and multilateral meetings. Altogether 4,700 documents, drafts and proposals, including the 30-thousand word Final Act, were submitted by various delegations. And each was the product of long debates and patient search for a compromise.

As mentioned earlier, the Geneva stage of the European Conference was far from being an easy one. Often the work was complicated by the far-fetched "demands" which some of the Western participants put to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Some people deliberately interpreted the Soviet Union's desire for detente and co-operation as a readiness to abandon the basic principles of its state system and fling all doors open to capitalist propaganda. A number of proposals were actually aimed at bringing about changes in the laws of the socialist countries.

This position was backed in the Western press by a kind of psychological "artillery barrage," a propaganda campaign revolving around such notions as "detente rejects closed doors" and "detente should be accompanied by ideological convergence," etc.

However, all attempts made in Geneva to push through various provisions amounting to interference in others' internal affairs were rejected and no such provisions were included in the Final Act. On the contrary, owing to the insistence of the USSR delegation and representatives of other socialist countries, the Final Act affirms the obligation of all states to respect the partners' sovereignty, laws and customs and refrain from interfering in their internal affairs.

It should be noted that the bilateral summit meet-

ings of participating countries held between 1973 and 1975 gave a powerful impetus to the diplomats' work in Geneva. Problems connected with the European Conference were discussed at meetings held in those years between Leonid Brezhnev and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Federal Germany, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, US President Gerald Ford and leaders of other countries.

Leonid Brezhnev's personal messages to the leaders of a number of Western countries in 1974 and 1975 also played an important role in the preparations for the Helsinki summit, which were constructive on the whole.

The multifaceted and painstaking work of the second stage of the European Conference held in Geneva, finally came to an end. It produced the draft of a document — the Final Act — which was submitted to the leaders of the participating countries at the main, third stage of the conference which took place in Helsinki.

The 35-nation summit in Helsinki lasted only 3 days, from July 30th to August lst, 1975. But those three days will go down in history as the finest hours in the history of Europe and the high point of detente in the 1970s. Those days in the Finnish capital were indeed history-making days. The solemnity of the occasion, the presence of top political leaders including Presidents and Prime Ministers of 33 European countries, the United States and Canada, the profound meaning of their speeches, the ceremony of the signing of the Final Act — all that made the three days unforgettable.

Journalists inclined to draw parallels compared the Helsinki summit with such milestones in European and world history as the Vienna Congress of 1814-15 and

the Paris Peace Conference of 1918-19 — largely because of the number of leaders the three events had attracted.

However, even in this external indicator the Helsinki Conference outstripped the Vienna Congress, the Paris Conference or any other international forum in European history. The Helsinki summit, for the first time, brought together the heads of state and government, leaders of ruling parties, and foreign ministers of 35 countries of Europe and North America. For the first time each of them had an opportunity to address such a prestigious audience and outline his country's views on the problems of European and world politics.

But of course this is not where the main difference lies. Unlike those conferences of the past, the Helsinki summit was not faced with the task of administering "the justice of the victors" over the vanquished and of revising the world's political map. Rather, it had a mission to perform which was unprecedented in history: to define a code of conduct governing relations between states with different social systems in conditions of detente, with the aim of advancing the process of detente still further.

What the conference was called upon to do was not to issue abstract declarations divorced from real life of which there had been so many in the past. The Helsinki meeting dealt with standards and principles which were brought forth by the realities of European life itself, which consolidated these realities and which were voluntarily accepted as a basis for building future relations among states.

The understandings reached at the meeting cover a wide range of the most pressing problems connected with peace, security and co-operation in various spheres. A firm foundation for peaceful coexistence of the participating countries was laid. The task now is to

get all the countries to put those understandings into practice. "In our view," said Leonid Brezhnev, addressing the meeting, "the sum total of the results of the Conference consists in the fact that international detente is being increasingly invested with concrete material content. It is precisely the materialization of detente which is the essence of everything that should make peace in Europe truly durable and unshakeable."

The most important decision of the European Conference — and that was noted in practically all the speeches made in *Finlandia* Hall — was the unanimous endorsement of a set of basic political principles guiding relations among states, which was soon dubbed "a code of detente" in the press. The Final Act, let us recall, affirms the following ten principles: 1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; 2. Refraining from the threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any state; 3. Inviolability of one another's frontiers and the frontiers of all states in Europe, and refraining at present and in the future from any encroachment on these frontiers; 4. Territorial integrity of States; 5. Peaceful settlement of disputes by means of negotiations, mediation and arbitration; 6. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states; 7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief; 8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples; 9. Co-operation among States on an equal footing promoting mutual understanding and trust, friendly relations, international peace, security and justice; 10. Fulfilment in good faith of obligations of States under international law.

"The participating States," the Final Act concludes, "express their determination fully to respect and apply

these principles as set forth in the present Declaration."

Such a comprehensive code of conduct of states had never before been evolved on any continent or in any part of the world. In this sense the Helsinki Conference not only enabled Europe to make an important collective step towards its own greater security, but also set an example to all the other continents of building inter-state relations based on peace and co-operation.

As for the pessimistic statements of those who complain about the "non-mandatory nature" of the Helsinki Final Act, we may say this in reply: the principles of relations among states proclaimed in Helsinki confirm the legal force of existing appropriate provisions included in bilateral inter-state treaties and other documents signed in recent years by the Soviet Union, France, the FRG, the USA, Great Britain, Italy and Canada as well as a number of other countries. Moreover, the special political significance and moral force of the Helsinki accords consist in that the Final Act was signed by the top leaders of 35 states (something without precedent in history) and also in that all of them declared from the rostrum in *Finlandia* Hall the intention of their governments to carry out the agreed provisions and to be guided by them in their foreign policies. This is the most that could be achieved at the given stage of detente. Earlier Europe could not dream of achieving even this much.

Former British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, when speaking in Helsinki about the decisions of the European Conference, said that they were more than good intentions or a desire to give a new direction to East-West relations, for they constituted a moral obligation which could be ignored only to the detri-

ment of all, and that they opened a new chapter in European history.

All the principles of relations between states endorsed in Helsinki are of paramount importance. However, the world press, proceeding from Europe's historical experience, was right to emphasize the particular significance of *the principle of the inviolability of frontiers*. A look at the political map of Europe crisscrossed by numerous national frontiers is sufficient to convince one why this is so, for most of the wars in Europe started with the pulling down of frontier posts. Thus, the unanimous top-level endorsement in Helsinki of the principle of the inviolability of frontiers emerged as a most important joint step towards detente.

After Helsinki world press comments also noted the importance of *the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs*. It is no secret that attempts to get around this principle, to impose on other nations one's own views concerning their way of life and to interfere in their internal affairs through subversion have long been an inseparable part of the cold war and "psychological warfare". The Helsinki Final Act describes such practices as impermissible, and this is of exceptional importance for improving the moral and political climate in Europe. The Final Act says that "the participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations."

The Final Act reaffirms such basic principles of international law as the sovereign equality of states, non-use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, peaceful settlement of disputes, and fulfilment in good faith of obligations

under international law, etc. This was of major significance for Europe and not only for Europe.

As for the understandings reached at the European Conference on political issues, it should be borne in mind that its participants not only proclaimed the aforesaid principles of their relations. The Final Act contains sections on the procedure of carrying some of them into practice, on confidence-building measures, and measures concerning certain aspects of security and disarmament. Thus, it provides for such measures as prior notification (21 days in advance) of large-scale military exercises involving more than 25 thousand troops held in a 250-km-wide zone along the frontiers of another participating State, mutual invitations to send observers to such exercises, advance notification of any other major troop movements, and a number of other steps. All that marks the beginning of a qualitatively new stage in building trust among states.

Much was said in *Finlandia* Hall and later in world press comments about the fact that, unlike many political forums of the past, the European Conference not merely defined a political code of conduct in Europe in conditions of detente, but also did much to give material content to detente itself. For example, the Final Act sets forth a wide-ranging and clear-cut programme for developing trade and industrial ties between the participating states, outlines a number of joint projects, and defines the most promising spheres of scientific and technological co-operation, including that of environmental protection. For the first time measures were agreed upon to expand human contacts and contacts between various institutions in the fields of information, culture and education on a multilateral basis.

Consequently, *the European Conference, for the first time, made it possible to develop a co-ordinating mech-*

anism of security and co-operation. Its decisions show with particular clarity the interdependence of these two organic components of detente.

The Conference took place on the rising tide of detente and at the same time was a powerful stimulus to furthering this trend. Historically, the Helsinki decisions may be seen as marking a new stage, in the building of a security system on the continent, its political groundwork being laid by the allied agreements on World War II, the USSR's postwar treaties with other European countries, the UN Charter, the peace treaties at the end of the war, and the State Treaty with Austria. A series of documents, treaties and agreements concluded in the early 1970s strengthened the moral, political, and legal basis of the emerging European security system. And the understandings reached at the Helsinki Conference, creating a multilateral system of commitments and appropriate measures, further broadened its political basis.

The Conference is undoubtedly a major international forum whose results and historical significance will be closely studied and debated for a long time to come. More and more aspects of the inter-state code of conduct endorsed in Helsinki will be revealed. And the same applies to the whole range of accords included in the Final Act, a document which most fully embodies the achievements of detente in the seventies of this century.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FINAL ACT

Addressing the European Conference, Leonid Brezhnev said: "It is very important to proclaim correct and just principles of relations among states. It is no less important to see that these principles are firmly rooted in present-day international relations, are put to practical use and are made a law of international life which is not to be breached by anyone."

CODE OF DETENTE

Throughout the five years since the Helsinki Conference the Soviet Union has made every effort to see that "the code of detente" recorded in the Final Act is observed in the practice of international relations. It is obvious that detente in Europe can develop successfully and promote co-operation in the fields envisaged by the Final Act only if these principles are strictly observed.

This is the view held by the socialist participating countries, as was clearly stated at all the bilateral and multilateral meetings of party and government leaders of the socialist community countries held after Helsinki.

The Soviet Union has shown its strong commitment

to detente by including in its new Constitution the fundamental principles of inter-state relations as written down in the Final Act.

The other socialist countries, too, by their actions demonstrate their firm resolve to be guided in their foreign policy by the basic principles of international relations set out in the Helsinki Final Act. It is fair to say that these principles have become foreign policy guidelines for the whole of the socialist community.

The time that has elapsed since the Conference has shown beyond doubt that implementation of the Final Act has been one of the main and growing trends in European politics. This concerns all states, big and small, socialist and capitalist, members of military alliances and neutral states alike. The Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the German Democratic Republic signed in October 1975, important understandings reached between Poland and the Federal Republic of Germany on solving problems left over since World War II, the final settlement of border disputes between Yugoslavia and Italy—these and other actions of states, which are different in contents and nature, reflect the main tendency in European life after Helsinki.

The practice of holding political consultations between states has become much more widespread in Europe over the past five years. Dozens of agreements have been concluded, and questions of implementation of the Final Act have been discussed in such international bodies as the UN Economic Commission for Europe, UNESCO and others.

It is also important that most of the capitalist participating states, first of all, France, the FRG, Finland, Austria and several other states have expressed support for the provisions of the Final Act in

no uncertain terms and have spoken in favour of furthering detente.

Over the past five years Soviet leaders have had meetings with the heads of state and government and the foreign ministers of most of the European countries. And at each meeting the Soviet side invariably stressed the need to consolidate the political results of the European Conference, strived to include a statement on commitment to the Helsinki accords in the final documents, agreements and joint communiques, and advanced concrete proposals to promote co-operation in the areas envisaged by the Final Act. The meetings between Leonid Brezhnev and French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in recent years have played an exceptionally important role in promoting European detente and in particular, in consolidating the principles of the Final Act. At each meeting statements were issued in support of the Helsinki accords and documents were signed on promoting Soviet-French co-operation in the spirit of the Final Act. During Leonid Brezhnev's visit to France in June 1977, the USSR and France issued a Joint Statement on the Relaxation of International Tension. In it the two countries, pioneers of detente, for the first time translated into concrete terms the guidelines for the further development of detente. And they gave top priority to implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and rendering active support to efforts undertaken in this direction.

During the next meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in April 1979, when the French President was on a visit to Moscow, the two countries signed a Programme of Further Co-operation, which underlines the importance of promoting peace and detente and of carrying out the accords of the Final Act.

When Leonid Brezhnev was on a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1978, the leaders of the two countries voiced their full support for detente, emphasizing the importance of implementing the accords of the Final Act. A Joint Declaration signed by President Leonid Brezhnev and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt says in part: "On the basis of the developments of the past decade the two sides conclude that detente is necessary, possible and useful. They see no reasonable alternative to peaceful co-operation of states despite divergencies in views on certain basic questions and difference of political, economic and social systems. They express their determination to expand and deepen the process of detente and to make it ongoing and stable." Of course, the process started in Helsinki involves not only such major European powers as the USSR, France, and the FRG. In recent years the so-called small and medium-sized countries of Europe have come to take an increasingly active part in the life of the continent. For example, over the past five years the German Democratic Republic has signed about a hundred treaties and agreements with most of the participating states in keeping with the principles and accords of the Final Act.

On the whole the work to put the Helsinki principles into European political practice has been fruitful.

One of the important understandings of the "first basket" of the Final Act which is being implemented is that concerning advance notification of major military exercises by each side and voluntary invitation of foreign observers to the exercises. Thus, the Soviet Union has notified the participating countries of all the military exercises conducted on its territory to which the Final Act applies (code names Caucasus, North, Berezina and others) and has invited observers to these exercises both from socialist states and many capitalist countries. Other participants in the Conference, including Western European countries, also observe this accord. This arrangement, unprecedented in European history, is regarded as important by all countries.

Regrettably, however, no progress has been made since the Helsinki summit in such an important area as ending the arms race and supplementing political detente in Europe with military detente. The stalemate is due to the bitter opposition to detente from the military-industrial complex of the imperialist powers and the NATO brass. They reject all measures proposed by the Soviet Union which could lead to real disarmament and thus endanger the profits of the munitions corporations which run into thousands of millions of dollars.

In view of the exceptional importance of the problem of military detente in overall East-West relations, we shall examine it separately further on.

THE MATERIAL BASIS OF CO-OPERATION

Now let us turn to another key area of the Conference decisions — co-operation in the field of economy, in science and technology and in environmental protection (second chapter of the Final Act). It should be noted that the Soviet Union put forward important concrete initiatives on this question only a few months after the Helsinki Conference. In December 1975 Leonid Brezhnev called for the holding of European congresses or inter-state meetings to discuss co-operation in environmental protection and development of transport and the power industry. These are the fields identified in the Final Act as the most promising for European co-operation. The Final Act also mentions such areas as broader contacts between trade organizations, firms and banks, easier

terms for business deals, information exchange, the broadening of international standardization, the encouragement of arbitration practice, etc. The Final Act specifically states that the participating countries shall seek to reduce or gradually remove all types of obstacles in the way of expanding trade. It also points out that the granting of most-favoured-nation status to one another can play a positive role in this respect.

Now that the Final Act is 5 years old it would be in order to have a look at how those accords have been implemented and by which countries. On the whole one may say that trade and economic links between the socialist and capitalist participating countries have been developing well. The advantages of detente have made themselves felt in European East-West trade and economic relations much sooner and more notably than in any other sphere. Over the past five years their trade turnover has gone up several times to reach about 60 thousand million dollars a year. The figure for 1955, during the cold war period, was only 3,500 million dollars and in 1966, before detente got under way, a mere 8,300 million dollars.

Expanding East-West trade takes place mainly in Europe, which accounts for more than two-thirds of the entire trade turnover between the industrialized capitalist and socialist countries.

This rapid growth is due to several factors, including the logic of economic development and scientific and technological progress, the requirements of the division of labour between the industrialized countries, the attitude among a certain section of businessmen in the West who were quick to realize the advantages of co-operation with socialist countries at a time of continuing economic upheavals in the capitalist world, and most important of all, the extremely favourable conditions for trade created by the policy of detente.

Soviet trade and economic links with the European capitalist countries are expanding at a fast rate. They already account for three quarters of the USSR's entire trade with the industrialized countries of the capitalist world. Between 1975 and 1978 Soviet trade with West European states went up 29 per cent and reached nearly 15 thousand million roubles. The USSR's major trading partners among them are the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Finland, France and Great Britain.

In recent years Soviet trade and economic links with West European countries have acquired qualitatively new features; they are often based on long-term large-scale intergovernmental agreements and programmes on economic co-operation and development of industrial co-operation including implementation of projects on a compensatory basis. The Soviet Union has signed more than 30 agreements and programmes on economic co-operation with West European countries since the European Conference. Bilateral agreements and other trade and economic documents have been signed with France, Denmark, Cyprus, Portugal, Norway, Italy, Iceland, Sweden, Canada, Ireland and Greece.

The USSR and France planned to increase their trade between 1975 and 1979 three times as compared with the preceding five-year period. And the targets were fulfilled. The volume of trade in that period totalled about 9 thousand million roubles. During the Moscow visit by President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in April 1979 the two sides agreed to make every effort to secure a further large increase in trade turnover between 1980 and 1985. They signed a Long-Term Programme on Developing and Deepening Co-operation for 1980-1990, which covers agriculture and transport in addition to the sectors on which accord

had been reached earlier. Industrial co-operation between the two countries has been considerably expanded too. French firms are to take part in constructing industrial complexes in the Soviet Union including industrial projects on a compensatory basis, and Soviet organizations are to take part in building industrial facilities in France.

Some of the Soviet-French co-operation projects are impressive indeed. A case in point is a hydraulic press with a capacity of 65 thousand tons, the biggest in the capitalist world, designed, manufactured and assembled by Soviet specialists in the French town of Issoire. The "giant" is 36 metres high and weighs 17 thousand tons or twice the weight of the Eiffel Tower. It is a symbol of Soviet-French co-operation.

Relations between the USSR and Finland also point to the immense potentialities of trade and economic links between countries with different social systems. After Helsinki the two countries concluded a new agreement on trade and payments for 1976-1980 which provides for doubling trade turnover as compared with the previous five years. In May 1977 President Leonid Brezhnev and President Urho Kekkonen signed a long-term Soviet-Finnish programme in Moscow for furthering bilateral trade, economic, industrial, scientific and technical co-operation up to the year 1990.

The Federal Republic of Germany has been one of th[illegible]SR's chief trading partners already for a [illegible]of years. Trade between the two countries [illegible].5 times between 1970 and 1977 and reached [illegible]ousand million roubles (more than 11 [illegible]lion West German marks) a year. This is [illegible]me of trade ever recorded between two [illegible]fferent social systems. And it exceeds [illegible]de between the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain and that between the United States and France. Trade and industrial contacts between the Soviet Union and the FRG involve 1,500 West German companies. The USSR accounts for 20 per cent of West German exports of die-casting machines, machine-tools, and forging and press equipment, and 17 per cent of equipment for the chemical industry. The FRG receives from the Soviet Union 20 per cent of its imports of diesel fuel, 20 per cent of apatite concentrate, 30 per cent of asbestos, 22 per cent of sawn timber, and a large percentage of oil and natural gas. Ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provide work for hundreds of thousands of factory and office employees in Western Europe. In this context it is understandable that both sides should be interested in developing trade and economic co-operation.

These issues were given major attention during Leonid Brezhnev's latest visit to the FRG in May 1978. At that time the two countries concluded an agreement on developing their long-term economic and industrial co-operation during the next 25 years or up to the beginning of the 21st century. This, among other things, reflects their belief in the need for detente in the forthcoming decades.

Recent years have seen a rapid growth of trade and economic links between the West and practically all the Eastern European socialist countries.

But nevertheless the volume of external economic ties, despite their noticeable growth since the European Conference, is still far behind the trade and economic potentials of Eastern and Western Europe. The Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries still account for only several per cent of the foreign trade of the Western European states.

One of the reasons for this is that some Western

countries have unreasonable trade restrictions against the East even after the European Conference and contrary to the spirit of the Final Act. They continue to impose export bans on whole classes of equipment with respect to the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Issuance of import licences for Soviet goods is still delayed sometimes and activities of mixed companies with Soviet participation are being hampered. The same applies to trade with the United States. The Americans still have discriminatory trade and credit legislations with regard to the USSR. Since many socialist countries are not covered by the usual most-favoured-nation treatment, customs duties imposed on their export-oriented goods often exceed those on imports from capitalist countries by as much as 50 to 100 per cent. This situation greatly hampers expansion of trade between the socialist countries and the United States. However, the United States has proved to be the loser. According to US estimates, the USA has lost orders it could have obtained from socialist countries worth thousands of millions of dollars. Other capitalist countries were only willing to accept them.

Soviet ministries and organizations have done much since the European Conference to implement other provisions of the Final Act which complement the accords reached in the fields of trade and industry. The USSR has expanded the publication of economic and business information of interest to its partners. The number of offices opened by Western companies and banks in the USSR has increased considerably. In Moscow the building of an international centre for trade and scientific and technological relations will soon be completed, which will be able to accommodate up to 300 Western trade missions.

The European business community has expressed

interest in an important proposal put forth by the socialist countries in keeping with the Helsinki spirit. In February 1976 the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) officially proposed that the European Economic Community (EEC) and CMEA conclude an agreement on basic relations between the two organizations. Negotiations on this question, which is important for expanding equal and mutually beneficial economic relations between Eastern and Western European countries, are now under way.

Scientific and technological relations between the USSR and Western countries have also been developing successfully since the Helsinki Conference. The Final Act has a special section on this question. The USSR has concluded many agreements with Western governments, firms and organizations in this field. At present the USSR has scientific and technological agreements with practically all the capitalist participating countries or their companies.

These agreements cover a number of specific fields. For example, the Soviet Union has concluded intergovernmental agreements on the peaceful uses of atomic energy with the USA, Sweden and Finland, on the peaceful uses of outer space with the USA and France, on environmental protection with Great Britain, France and the USA, and on health protection and medicine with Italy, the USA and France, etc.

In keeping with the Final Act and the understandings reached at the Belgrade meeting, conferences are being held to discuss various aspects of scientific and technological co-operation. A meeting of experts in La Valetta, the capital of Malta, in February and March of 1979 discussed measures to promote economic cooperation and trade, preservation and rational use of energy resources, expansion of Mediterranean shipping lines, more active exchanges of results of research,

better co-operation in Mediterranean fishing, protection of the Mediterranean ecosystem, broader co-operation in seismology, and compilation of a comprehensive history of the Mediterranean under UNESCO auspices, etc.

The Soviet Union took an active part in the meeting. As a Black Sea country and therefore also a Mediterranean country, the USSR sincerely wants all the nations in that region to enjoy the benefits of detente and peaceful co-operation fully and on an equal footing.

The Helsinki Conference gave a fresh impetus to the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Mediterranean countries. From 1975 to early 1979 the USSR signed 13 agreements and long-term programmes on trade and economic co-operation with them. Growth of mutually beneficial co-operation between the Soviet Union and these countries has led to a fifty-per-cent increase in their trade over the last four years. At present it accounts for 12 per cent of Soviet foreign trade.

The meeting in Malta was on the whole a useful concrete step toward developing co-operation in an important region and in the spirit of the Helsinki accords.

Another useful undertaking in this sphere was the high-level All-European Conference on Co-operation in Environmental Protection held in Geneva in November 1979. The initiative for holding such a forum came from the Soviet Union, as said earlier, shortly after the European Conference, in December 1975. The urgency of this problem hardly needs any proof. The state of the environment in a considerable part of Europe and North America, where the world's leading industrial countries are situated, is causing

serious concern because of pollution of rivers and seas there and of air pollution in many big cities.

Damage to the environment could be prevented by introducing waste-free technologies in industries, and to develop such technology as well as other measures to combat environmental pollution co-operation among the industrialized states is necessary. That, in short, was what prompted the Soviet Union to call for the convening of a European conference on environmental protection.

The Soviet initiative was studied by the UN Economic Commission for Europe which adopted a decision in April 1979 to hold the proposed conference.

The conference aroused keen interest on the part of all states that signed the Helsinki Final Act. It was attended by government officials in charge of environmental protection from most of the European countries as well as the USA and Canada, hundreds of scientists and experts and representatives of international bodies. Special attention was given to problems of waste-free technology against transborder carriage of air pollutants, that is, substances discharged by industrial enterprises into the atmosphere. The conference also discussed the protection and rational use of the water resources and conservation of plant and animal life. A convention was adopted on the transborder carriage of air pollutants in which the member countries of the UN Economic Commission for Europe expressed their resolve to rid man and his environment from polluted air and, to this end, to reduce and prevent the entry of pollutants into the atmosphere. The convention also provides for monitoring of the state of the atmosphere in Europe, joint research and development and regular exchange of relevant information.

In a Declaration on Co-operation in the Field of Low- and Non-Waste Technology and Reutilization and Recycling of Waste the conference underlines the conviction of the European countries that such a technology will help prevent damage to the environment, ensure more rational use of energy resources and raw materials, preserve valuable non-renewable resources and prevent their excessive use.

The European conference on environmental protection became an example of fruitful co-operation in the Helsinki spirit.

Other proposals on developing co-operation advanced by the Soviet Union in 1975 have been under consideration by the international community. The UN Economic Commission for Europe has been studying the proposal for holding European congresses to discuss transport and energy problems.

The All-European Scientific Forum in Hamburg in February 1980 proved to be an extremely important international gathering. The holding of such a forum was envisaged by the Final Act. It was attended by more than 400 leading scientists from 33 European countries, the United States and Canada. The Soviet delegation was headed by Academician Blokhin, President of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences. The urgent problems discussed included research on alternative sources of energy and food production, present-day trends in medical research, and particularly in the fields of cardiovascular, oncological and viral diseases, and comparative studies of socio-economic and cultural phenomena with emphasis on questions of the environment and urban development. It was for the first time in history that prominent scientists gathered to examine questions of lasting importance, and the fact that they did was a victory for the cause of European security.

To sum up, it may be said that the efforts to carry out the Helsinki accords on trade, economy, science and technology have been fruitful and that considerable progress has been made in all these spheres which are of vital importance for the European countries. The material basis of peaceful co-operation in Europe is steadily becoming stronger.

"THE THIRD BASKET": WHO IS LAGGING BEHIND?

It is common knowledge that understandings on cultural and humanitarian issues figure prominently in the whole package of provisions contained in the Final Act. They deal with co-operation in the fields of culture, education, information and human contacts. Although these problems are not of such universal importance as, say, the question of war and peace, they do concern everyday life of many people, and that is why they are very much in the spotlight. It was clear from the outset that, as far as the implementation of the Final Act was concerned, this section would require the most painstaking, diversified and long-term work because it deals with an extremely wide range of issues, national, individual, cultural, legal, long-term and short-term ones. All of them are linked with the general world situation in one way or another, with the internal legislation of states, and the cultural traditions of the nations.

It would be impossible to set out the numerous concrete understandings on cultural and humanitarian co-operation in the Final Act without first defining the fundamental principles on which such co-operation should be based. This created considerable difficulties in drawing up the final document of the European Conference, but it did clear the way for agreement on practical matters. The Final Act states in a clearcut

manner, thanks to the insistence of the socialist countries, that "this co-operation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant document" (namely, the principles of sovereign equality, non-interference in internal affairs, equality, respect for human rights and basic freedoms), and that it should "help strengthen peace and mutual understanding among nations and the spiritual enrichment of the human personality regardless of race, sex, language or religion." The accords of the "Third Basket" are fully in keeping with the obligation of the participating States contained in the first of the ten principles of the Final Act to "respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations."

The Helsinki programme of cultural and humanitarian ties among states adopted on that basis is unique in that it covers a very wide range of trends and forms of co-operation. There is hardly an area in the field of exchange of culture, education and information which is not taken into consideration in the Final Act.

A good deal of pessimism was expressed in the West both during and after the Helsinki Conference about the possibilities of implementing the programme of cultural and humanitarian co-operation set out in the Final Act. It was said, for example, that differences in social systems and the long years of the cold war had created "a rhesus factor of cultural incompatibility" between the socialist and capitalist countries and had destroyed beyond repair the bridges of cultural communication between them.

Today, five years after the signing of the historic document, one may say that the pessimists have proved wrong and that cultural and humanitarian ties

among the participants in the European Conference have developed successfully and on a scale unprecedented in history.

The Soviet Union, which regards the Final Act as a single whole, gives no less attention to carrying out the accords on cultural and humanitarian questions than to political, trade or economic matters.

Probably no other country can match the Soviet Union in the scope of its international cultural ties. It has such ties with most of the world's nations, and has concluded special intergovernmental agreements with more than 100 countries. The volume of the USSR's cultural ties has doubled over the past decade.

The European Conference's decisions gave a fresh impetus to expanding cultural ties with the capitalist countries. After Helsinki the Soviet Union has signed agreements, protocols and other documents on developing cultural and humanitarian ties with many participating countries, including France, Portugal, Italy, the USA, Great Britain and Belgium.

The scope of the USSR's international cultural ties can be seen in the fact that each year about 6,000 performances by foreign actors, musicians, dancers, etc. are given in approximately 100 cities in all the 15 Union Republics, and that over 180 Soviet performing groups go on concert tours abroad.

The Soviet Union is in favor of exchange of outstanding actors and musicians and works of art which would be culturally enriching and would promote better understanding among nations. In recent years the Bolshoi Theatre, the Moiseyev dancers, the Leningrad symphony orchestra, the song and dance ensembles of Georgia, Uzbekistan and other republics, the Osipov Russian Folk Orchestra, the Moscow chamber orchestra and circus troupes, etc. have toured Western European countries and North America.

And many major performing groups and dozens of theatrical troupes from capitalist countries have visited the USSR, including the French Compagnie Renault-Barrault, the Thalia Theatre of Hamburg, Piccolo of Milan, the Greek National Theatre, a troupe from San Francisco, and the Rue de Bruxelles Theatre.

Much is being done in the Soviet Union to popularize the best works of Western dramatists. At present the country's theatres are staging performances of about 130 works by contemporary Western authors, besides classics.

One of the biggest channels of cultural exchange is the cinema. Each year the Soviet Union purchases and distributes countrywide 60 to 70 films from Western countries. During the traditional Moscow film festivals many cinemas show dozens of films from Western countries, which is several times more than the number of Soviet films shown in those countries for years. The number of US films purchased and distributed by the Soviet Union is about twice the number of Soviet films purchased and distributed by the United States. These figures speak louder than words. A similar situation exists in film exchanges between the USSR and France, Great Britain and Italy.

Approximately the same disproportion exists in the field of foreign literature publication in the Soviet Union and capitalist countries. If the relevant accords of the Final Act were carried out, that would help the Western countries to put things right. The first steps in this direction have been taken but they are far from being adequate. A number of intergovernmental agreements concluded by the Soviet Union with other countries since the Helsinki Conference contain special clauses on encouraging the publication of one

another's books. Protocols have been signed with publishers' associations and many publishing houses in capitalist countries on increased publications of translated works by each side. But nevertheless no Western country can compare with the USSR in the scope of foreign literature publication. Over the 60 years from 1917 to 1977 the Soviet publishing houses have translated and printed 73 thousand works by authors of 136 countries in a total circulation of 2,064.5 million copies. Works by more than 200 foreign authors have been issued in the USSR in editions exceeding one million copies. The Soviet Union has published 3,928 books by 375 American authors with a total printing of about 190 million copies and 4,004 books by 341 English authors with a total printing of almost 222 million copies, etc.

After the Helsinki Conference the USSR put out a unique three-volume collection of European poetry. The publication was undertaken at the suggestion of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation. The work includes verses and poems by almost 500 European and Soviet writers; those by non-Russian authors appear both in their original languages and in Russian translations, and poems by Soviet authors also appear in translations into a number of European languages. The collection includes works by 31 English poets, 18 Austrian, 43 German, 36 French, 32 Yugoslav, 23 Polish and 13 Icelandic poets.

The publication of another unique edition, a 200-volume World Literature Library, has been completed. One hundred and thirty-seven of the volumes are devoted to works by foreign authors (2,600 in all), ranging from Homer to contemporary writers. Many similar publications have been brought out in the USSR, including an anthology of American poetry

and an anthology of Spanish poetry in Russian translations covering the years 1792-1976. The number of titles by foreign authors published in the Soviet Union has increased noticeably since the European Conference. Between 1975 and 1978 it went up by 50 per cent, from 80 million to nearly 120 million copies.

The Final Act contains a provision on the study of foreign languages. In the Soviet Union foreign languages are studied on a large scale. At its secondary and higher schools about 12 million students study English, nearly the same number study German, and almost 3 million study French. USSR Central Television broadcasts English, French, Spanish and German lessons every week.

As for the scope of Russian language studies in Western countries, it is insignificant compared to foreign language studies in the USSR. A total of about 130 thousand people study Russian in the United States and only 32 thousand in France, etc. Some people say that the USSR has more teachers of Western languages than there are Russian language students in the West. And they are right.

It must be said therefore that the Western countries are lagging behind in implementing the Helsinki accord on encouraging the study of the languages of the participating countries.

Positive results have been accumulated in an area which had caused considerable difficulties in the drafting of the Final Act, namely, in the matter of providing better conditions for the professional activities of journalists and the exchange of information. After Helsinki the USSR has reached an agreement with most of the Western participating countries on granting on a reciprocal basis multiple entry and exit one-year visas to permanently accredited correspondents; formalities have been simplified and better

facilities provided for travelling in the countries to which they are assigned. In 1976 the USSR Supreme Soviet adopted new regulations on contacts between Soviet ministries and departments and foreign journalists, which make it much easier for the latter to obtain information from various Soviet government agencies.

Since the Helsinki Conference both the number of permanently accredited foreign newsmen in Moscow (they total about 300 at present) and the amount of information made available to them have considerably increased. About 100 news conferences, meetings and discussions are held every year to which they are invited, and these are often attended by Soviet Government officials. The USSR Foreign Ministry Press Department arranges dozens of group tours for journalists to various Soviet republics. Once a trip was organized for newsmen to an ice floe carrying the North Pole-23 drifting research lab. In addition, foreign newsmen accredited in Moscow go on hundreds of individual tours of the Soviet Union.

Hundreds of journalists come to the USSR for short periods to cover state visits or for personal reasons. They are also offered the services of news centres; they attend press conferences and meetings, etc. The USSR Union of Journalists invites up to a thousand journalists from other countries to the Soviet Union every year, organizing tours and arranging meetings and discussions with people at their requests.

The work of journalists is closely linked with the dissemination of information in the participating states. The number of Western newspapers and magazines sold at newsstands in the USSR has increased about tenfold since the Helsinki Conference. Soviet Television now broadcasts an even greater number of foreign programmes than previously although even then it used three times as many Western productions

compared with the number of Soviet programmes used by Western countries, as indicated by UNESCO figures.

Unfortunately, the West is still maintaining its centres of psychological warfare against the socialist countries. The activities of those centres seriously hamper the exchange of information. For already more than a quarter of a century the notorious American broadcasting stations Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe have been engaged in subversion against the socialist countries. Both Soviet and foreign newspapers have published convincing evidences of their subversive activities which violated both the spirit of detente and the Final Act.

The socialist countries have shown a good example in implementing yet another understanding of the European Conference, namely, the publication of the full text of the Final Act. Its total print in the socialist countries runs into more than 25 million copies, with the Soviet Union accounting for 20 million, against just one million in all the capitalist countries taken together. The paradox here is that those who raise the biggest clamour about "freedom of information" and carrying out the Final Act are in fact trying to keep the contents of this historic document from becoming widely known.

Western propaganda claims that the socialist countries seek to "avoid" human contacts and have what is termed a "closed society." However, the years that have passed since the Helsinki Conference have disproved those contentions. For instance, during 1975, the year when the Conference was held, more than 58 million foreign nationals visited the CMEA member countries, and thirty-five million citizens of the socialist community countries travelled abroad. In recent years figures are even higher.

Naturally enough, tourism provides the most opportunities for contacts between citizens of different countries. In the three years before the Helsinki Conference 9.9 million foreigners visited the Soviet Union; in the three years after the conference their number grew to 13 million. In 1978 alone 5 million people from 162 countries visited the USSR and more than 3 million Soviet citizens travelled abroad. In the current five-year period (1976-1980) tourism is to increase 50 per cent. The USSR is expected to have 25 million foreign tourists and 18 million Soviet citizens will make trips to other countries during this period.

Much is also being done on other questions touched upon in the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviet Union has taken steps to facilitate and expand contacts between Soviet and foreign citizens. For instance, procedures for people applying to go abroad to join their families have been simplified. The number of reciprocal trips based on family or friendly ties has increased considerably. Fees for exit visas have been reduced appreciably and a number of people going abroad are exempt from such fees altogether. Customs formalities have been simplified, and in the event that exit visas are not granted, the decision is reviewed every 6 months on the request of the applicant. No payment of any fee is required in filing repeated applications for exit visas, etc. Applications for exit visas by Soviet citizens married to foreigners are handled according to the relevant legislation in force as envisaged by the Final Act. In recent years thousands of Soviet citizens married to foreigners have taken up residence in 110 countries.

On the question of human contacts, it must be borne in mind that the Final Act provides for expansion of such contacts with the aim of strengthening mutual understanding among nations. Attempts to use such

contacts for quite opposite purposes contradict the very essence of that document. This applies to smuggling banned literature into the socialist countries and sending envoys from foreign secret services and anti-communist organizations. Regrettably, such cases do occur, and rather often. It is only natural that the Soviet Union does not encourage such "contacts."

Thus, in the matter of carrying out the third chapter of the Final Act, one can say with confidence that the Soviet Union is far ahead of its Western partners in the main areas — cultural exchanges, the publishing of foreign literature, contacts in the field of education, exchange of films and contacts between public, sporting, youth and other organizations. And no malicious propaganda campaigns launched in some of the Western countries time and again can conceal this fact.

IV. THE BELGRADE MEETING

The Belgrade meeting of 35 states which participated in the European Conference was the first of the multilateral forums provided for by the Helsinki summit. Its purpose, as clearly stated in a separate paragraph in the Final Act, is to conduct "a thorough exchange of views both on the implementation of the provisions of the Final Act and of the tasks defined by the Conference, as well as, in the context of the questions dealt with by the latter, on the deepening of their mutual relations, the improvement of security and the development of co-operation in Europe, and the development of the process of detente in the future." The Belgrade meeting basically differed from the European Conference itself in its mandate. Its purpose was to hold a thorough exchange of views on the above-mentioned questions and to work out generally acceptable recommendations on concrete steps to achieve further progress in the Helsinki spirit.

Two opposite approaches emerged in the Yugoslav capital on this question of the tasks and purpose of the Belgrade meeting. Some of the NATO countries tried to force the meeting to adopt a new and bulky document which would compete with the Final Act, as it were, revise its contents and replace it altogether. The US delegation attempted to reduce the many-sided Final Act to the human rights problem, which was misrepresented in fact, and use it as a pretext for

interfering in the internal affairs of the socialist countries, putting the latter on "trial." The delegations from the socialist countries had to make big effort to uphold the spirit and letter of the Final Act and prevent it from being distorted, and to guide the Belgrade meeting along the lines defined in Helsinki so that the 35-nation meeting in the Yugoslav capital would become a new, if modest, step towards detente.

It was also necessary to give a true picture of how the decisions of the European Conference were being implemented and to show that progress along the way opened in Helsinki was both possible and even inevitable. It was no secret that both on the eve of the Belgrade meeting and during the meeting itself Western mass media were engaged in a big campaign to play down the results of the European Conference. It was claimed that the socialist countries failed to abide by the Helsinki accords, lagged behind the Western states in their implementation, and feared and opposed the development of ties with the capitalist world in a number of spheres, in particular, in the field of human contacts, the spread of information, etc.

That was the situation in which preparations for the Belgrade meeting were made and the meeting took place from October 4, 1977 to March 9, 1978.

In keeping with their principled policy the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries put forth a number of important proposals in Belgrade on key problems of European security and co-operation. They submitted as an official document a programme of action to consolidate military detente in Europe as outlined in Leonid Brezhnev's speech in the Kremlin on October 21, 1977. The programme called for the conclusion of a treaty by the participants in the European Conference committing them not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other; the

reaching of an agreement on not enlarging at least the military-political alliances in Europe by admitting new members; the reaching of an agreement on not holding military exercises involving more than 50 to 60 thousand troops; and the extension of confidence-building measures envisaged in the Final Act to countries in the Southern Mediterranean.

The programme also called for the holding of special consultations in the near future, attended by all the participants in the European Conference, to discuss matters connected with military detente and other possible constructive moves in this sphere.

The delegations from the socialist countries submitted a number of proposals for broadening the sphere of application of the Helsinki accords in international relations. For instance, the USSR and Poland suggested that the participating states incorporate principles set out in the Final Act in their legislation. Bulgaria put forward proposals on facilitating the successful preparation for a World Disarmament Conference and on easing military confrontation in Europe on the basis of the principle of undiminished security for both sides and taking into account the security interests of all the European states. The German Democratic Republic put forth a proposal on carrying out the Final Act by concluding appropriate treaties in the political, economic and cultural spheres. A proposal advanced by the GDR and Czechoslovakia called for the development of political consultations among the participants in the European Conference. The GDR also submitted a draft document on curbing the activities of fascist, revenge-seeking and neo-Nazi organizations which contravened international law and Final Act. One of the Soviet proposals called for additional measures to guarantee the personal security of representatives or citizens of one country on

another's territory and also the security of future cultural, sporting and other events.

In the economic field the Soviet delegation proposed that recommendations be adopted on holding conferences or international meetings at an early date to discuss questions of environmental protection and the development of the power industry and transport.

The Polish delegation suggested that the participants in the European Conference undertake commitments to speed up the dismantling of existing trade barriers and not to create fresh obstacles in the way of trade and economic co-operation.

The socialist countries also put forward a number of important initiatives in the sphere of culture, education, information and human contacts. The Soviet delegation proposed that measures be adopted to facilitate meetings of public figures in defence of peace, security and friendship among nations, the holding of regular folk art festivals in the participating countries, and the holding of an international symposium on the restoration of historical and cultural monuments. The Polish delegation submitted a draft document on the education of young people in the spirit of peace. Concrete proposals on promoting cultural co-operation were also advanced by Bulgaria and Romania. Yugoslavia proposed declaring 1980 the year of cultural co-operation of the participants in the European Conference and expanding co-operation among various press agencies on an all-European basis. The Czechoslovak delegation proposed that the mass media be encouraged to undertake activities to strengthen peace and mutual trust and that propaganda of war and of the use or threat of force be banned. The GDR delegation submitted a draft document calling for wider publication of the full text of the Final Act in the participating countries.

The mere enumeration of these proposals shows the constructive approach of the socialist countries towards the work of the Belgrade Meeting and detente. It must be pointed out that some European non-socialist countries also made a number of interesting proposals in Belgrade. Among them nine neutral and non-aligned states submitted a draft document emphasizing the necessity of limiting arms in Europe and stepping up the dragged out disarmament talks. It also expressed support for the special UN General Assembly session on disarmament preparations for which were under way then. Norway submitted a proposal on expanding international co-operation in environmental protection while Austria urged more vigorous European co-operation in the energy field and in the use of inland waterways. Proposals submitted by Spain and Portugal touched on the future of millions of immigrant workers. France put forward proposals on the holding of an assembly of youth organizations from the participating countries, on school curricula and the study of foreign languages.

However, as is known, all these concrete and sensible proposals were not reflected in the final document of the Belgrade Meeting. What is the explanation for this?

The point is that the United States and its main NATO allies rejected the socialist countries' proposals aimed at strengthening European security, achieving military detente, and assuring more effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Act. They failed to put forth a single proposal of their own along these lines at the Belgrade Meeting.

Indeed, while the Belgrade Meeting was under way, plans were being drawn up in the USA and at NATO headquarters to start a new round of the arms race, threats were made to mass-produce neutron weapons

and cruise missiles, and record military budgets were adopted. According to the schemes of US strategists, the Belgrade Meeting was to be a failure, and the failure would presumably complicate the world situation and help the military-industrial complex and NATO brass achieve their objectives.

It was planned to undermine the Belgrade Meeting by massive interference in the internal affairs of the socialist countries on the pretext of "concern" for the rights of their citizens.

Even before the Belgrade Meeting began there were increasing calls from across the ocean to turn the gathering into a kind of tribunal where the United States would demand of other sovereign countries that they "report" on their progress in carrying out the Final Act and on their handling of their domestic affairs. The US Congress set up a Commission for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Under a bill signed by the US President the Commission was "empowered" to check the actions of the participating countries to determine whether these were in line with the provisions of the Final Act. That Commission had managed to aggravate the situation even before the Belgrade Meeting. Its members toured many European countries to look for instances of failure to comply with the provisions of the Final Act and launched a propaganda campaign in the press about their "findings", which were duly published by the Commission in several volumes. They contain nothing but false charges directed against the socialist countries and constituted gross interference in their internal affairs.

Unfortunately, the parliaments of Great Britain and Federal Germany followed in the footsteps of the US Congress.They also produced all sorts of "reports"

about the failure of other countries to comply with the Final Act.

At the Belgrade Meeting the US delegation took a line of confrontation and "psychological warfare" from the very first day. It tried to distort the essence of the Helsinki principles of interstate relations and to interfere in the affairs of other countries. A Reuter correspondent reported that in his first speech at the Belgrade Meeting consisting of 4,000 words the head of the US delegation devoted 2,000 words to lamentations about "violations of human rights" in other countries (but not in the USA, of course).

This line adopted by the United States and its closest NATO allies was reflected in their numerous proposals which in fact constituted interference in the domestic affairs of other states. The proposals concerned such issues as the procedure of issuing exit visas, marriages with foreigners, access to foreign embassies, the circulation of foreign publications, etc. The purpose behind all this was firstly, to divert the attention of the participants in the talks from the key problems of disarmament, security and co-operation in Europe thus distorting the main contents of the Helsinki Final Act, and, secondly, to picture the NATO countries headed by the USA as the "champions of human rights".

Under those circumstances some of the delegates had to remind the US representatives of the human rights situation in the USA itself. They pointed to the millions of unemployed, discrimination against blacks and other coloured people, mass-scale persecution of political dissenters, victimization of civil rights workers, the Watergate scandal, police surveillance of citizens, telephone tapping, and political murders.

And the delegations from other NATO countries that tried to go along with the United States on the

human rights issue did not feel quite comfortable either. The anti-democratic Berufsverbot campaign (ban on jobs) continued in Federal Germany and the neo-Nazis there were becoming more active. In Ulster British "democracy" continued to use bayonets and bullets and the number of victims by the time of the Belgrade Meeting had run into nearly 1,700. In Canada a scandal around the secret service broke out in the autumn of 1977 when it was revealed that the secret service had planted its agents in the headquarters of political parties and public organizations, tapped phones, committed arsons, etc. Against this background the attempt to discuss human rights in the socialist countries was sheer hypocrisy.

The Soviet delegation did not avoid discussing human rights although it did not try to impose such a discussion on others since it believed that there were other more important problems to consider at the Belgrade Meeting, namely, security and co-operation.

The Soviet Union attaches major importance to human rights. The Soviet State, from its very first days, paid special attention to the rights and freedoms of man. Concern for the people's well-being is part of national policy. And the Soviet Union's achievements in the human rights sphere over the 60 years of socialist construction are impressive indeed. Unemployment, poverty and hunger have been eradicated; and free medical service, universal education, social security and women's equality have been introduced. The social causes of crime have been eliminated, the country's laws prohibit violence and cruelty, exploitation, profiteering, and the propaganda of racial or national enmity. It has set up a system of real political, economic and legal guarantees for the rights and freedoms of citizens. Their interests are reliably protected.

On the world scene the Soviet Union has been an initiator of and participant in major international conferences on human rights and has consistently put the conference decisions into practice. It was the Soviet Union that insisted on including the fundamental principles of ensuring human rights in the UN Charter. The USSR took an active part in drawing up the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is a signatory of International Covenants on Human Rights.

Meanwhile, as it was pointed out at the Belgrade Meeting, the leading Western powers have still to ratify the main international documents on human rights. The USA, for instance, has ratified only 10 out of approximately 50 such documents. A number of West European countries have not even signed the International Covenants on Human Rights.

Thus, the discussion of human rights was imposed on the Belgrade Meeting by the US delegation, mainly for propaganda purposes, which was consistent with Washington's well-known policy of proclaiming the USA the world's "champion" of human rights. It also showed that the United States, while trying to use the subject of human rights as a smoke screen for meddling in the domestic affairs of other countries, had no intention of securing human rights at home or acceding to the international documents on human rights. And finally, the United States attempted to heighten confrontation on the human rights issue in order to hamper the successful work of the Belgrade Meeting in the main sphere — the consolidation of security and broadening of co-operation in Europe. The USA tried to create tension, revive the cold war and justify a new boost to the arms race.

And yet the artificially blown-up human rights debate failed to divert the Belgrade Meeting from its main task set by the heads of 35 states in Helsinki. This

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was due mainly to the firm stand taken by the socialist countries. The plans to wreck the Belgrade Meeting hatched across the ocean in order to heighten tension and justify another round in the arms race and, in the final analysis, a return to the cold war, ended in failure.

One of the main results of the Belgrade Meeting is that European detente has survived the massive attack launched by the champions of confrontation on both sides of the Atlantic.

Another important point that emerged from the Meeting is that any attempts to use the language of ultimatum in conducting talks with socialist countries, including multilateral ones, with the aim of interfering in their domestic affairs, are doomed to failure. Such was the approach adopted by the United States and some of its allies at the Belgrade Meeting, an approach which utterly contravenes the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act.

On the whole the Belgrade Meeting fulfilled its mission. It adopted a final document, brief but important politically. It emphasizes the importance of detente, affirms the historic role of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, and expresses readiness of the participating countries to continue to implement the provisions of the Final Act. The Meeting described the exchange of views as useful, although, naturally, there was no consensus on all the issues discussed.

The Final Document also outlines a number of concrete measures to be taken, which represent a continuation of the work started in Helsinki. They include a conference of experts to pave the way for the European scientific forum envisaged by the Final Act, a meeting of experts to work out a generally acceptable method of settling disputes between states by peaceful means and a special meeting on co-operation in the Mediterranean region. A decision was taken on holding another meeting of the Belgrade type in Madrid in late 1980.

The Belgrade Meeting showed that the Helsinki cause continued to advance despite all the difficulties created by the opponents of detente.

V. THE STRUGGLE FOR DETENTE GOES ON

The line followed by the USA and some of its allies at the Belgrade Meeting reflects a dangerous tendency that has been developing in Washington and NATO since 1975. It represents an unhealthy reaction on the part of the ruling class in the chief imperialist power to the rapid progress of world socialism and the achievements of detente. The reactionary forces in Washington link all the major world developments in the 1970s with the policy of detente and the allegedly "unilateral advantages" it offers to world socialism and its "disadvantages" for the West. This applies to the favourable development of relations between the USSR, France, Federal Germany and other capitalist countries, the victories scored by Vietnam and Laos, the success of the European Conference, the downfall of fascism in Greece, Portugal and Spain, the final collapse of the colonial system and the emergence of new socialist-orientated countries in Africa.

ATTACK FROM ACROSS THE OCEAN

Changes in US foreign policy are taking place under the influence of the increased activity of those opposing detente — the military-industrial complex, the extreme Right-Wing groups and other forces having a vested interest in checking the emergent positive trends in Soviet-US relations. The intensified activity of those

forces shows their growing fear lest the policy of detente, which has scored such important victories within a short time, should become irreversible if unchecked. At first those forces did not take detente seriously. They knew that there had been ups and downs in international relations before. However, when SALT-2 began to take shape following the entry into force of SALT-1, and when there appeared prospects of the reduction of strategic offensive arms following a substantial improvement of the political climate in Europe and the signing of the Helsinki Final Act, the situation changed. It became questionable whether the military-industrial complex could continue to exert a decisive influence on US foreign policy. The interests of those who had a stake in the cold war were threatened. It was then that those forces launched a big attack against detente.

The reader may recall the series of actions taken by Washington to complicate the world situation since 1976: the campaign of crude interference in the domestic affairs of the socialist countries under the pretext of defending "human rights", the artificial limitation of ties with the Soviet Union including cancellation of planned exchanges of delegations, the "freezing" of the Soviet-American strategic arms limitation talks, the attempts to wreck the Belgrade Meeting and distort the meaning of the Helsinki Final Act, the threats to deploy cruise missiles and to start the mass production of neutron bombs and deploy them in Europe, the intensification of the race in other types of arms, another increase in the US military budget, etc.

The militarist campaign was jointly launched by the US "hawks", the NATO generals, reactionary politicians in the Western European countries and a huge army of propaganda-mongers. And it had its results. The Brussels NATO Council session in May 1977

adopted a decision under US pressure to increase military spending by 3 per cent annually in the next five years in real terms and to start carrying out a series of far-reaching programmes for the production and purchases of weapons.

A year later in May 1978, another NATO Council session was held in Washington. The special UN General Assembly session on disarmament was then under way in New York. The NATO meeting was a kind of challenge to public opinion. NATO drew up another large-scale programme of war preparations covering a period up to 1995. The programme calls for a build-up of the armed forces and of stocks of armaments and explosives, production of new missiles, raising the efficiency of troop airlifting facilities, etc. The programme will cost NATO members 80 thousand million dollars in the next 10 to 15 years.

The main factor in all these actions, nicknamed "operation counterdetente" in the press, is the attempt of the US military-industrial complex to see that a new round of the arms race is not halted, because it spells huge profits amounting to thousands of millions of dollars. According to US figures, in 1968 the total cost of the Pentagon's 48 programmes for the development of new types and systems of arms was 205 thousand million dollars. Thus, enormous profits are at stake in the battle for and against detente. This is why such mighty forces are being thrown into "operation counterdetente".

The United States has launched a big drive to persuade its European partners to increase their military spending. Each meeting of top NATO political and military bodies in recent years has led to increased military allocations for the purpose of countering the "Soviet threat".

In that situation the future of detente depended on how the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries reacted to Washington's provocative policy. Evidently, there was hope in the US capital that the Soviet Union would likewise resort to arms buildup, heighten confrontation, make charges and counter-charges in keeping with the "rules" of psychological warfare, and scale down relations with the United States and its NATO partners. That, apparently, would mean the end of detente.

But the Soviet Union did not choose to act in this way. It countered Washington's line by pursuing a firm, cool-headed policy of continuing detente. It put forward new important proposals to end the arms race, including those submitted at the special UN General Assembly session on disarmament, adopted a constructive stand at the Soviet-US SALT-2 negotiations, displayed flexibility and together with its allies advanced a series of new proposals at the Vienna talks, and continued to develop relations of active co-operation with the Western European countries, first of all, with France. The USSR did nothing to curtail bilateral Soviet-US ties. Nor did it allow itself to be dragged into another round of psychological warfare.

The scheme to push the Soviet Union off the course of detente and to provoke the socialist countries into taking counterdetente actions failed. The opponents of detente also failed to attain yet another important objective. In launching an attack against detente the reactionary forces in the United States naturally hoped to draw into it all of their allies, at least, all of the NATO members. But that did not happen.

It has been widely noted that in many of their foreign policy statements French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Federal German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Chairman of the Social Democratic Party

of Germany Willy Brandt as well as other West European leaders have found it necessary to speak about the importance of detente and urge the continuation of this policy. Such statements are in sharp contrast to the pronouncements of Washington's leadership, but nevertheless they are being made and reiterated.

The practice of holding bilateral political talks between socialist and capitalist countries in Europe have continued to gain momentum. A major role in this was played by the meetings in recent years between Leonid Brezhnev, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Federal German Chacellor Helmut Schmidt. As mentioned earlier, at those meetings documents were signed affirming a commitment to the policy of detente, the directions of its further development were outlined, statements were made expressing a determination to adhere to the Helsinki spirit and implement the Final Act, and long-term agreements on trade and economic co-operation were concluded.

Over the past few years the heads of state or government and foreign ministers of Sweden, Turkey, Finland, Great Britain, Denmark, Spain and other European countries have paid official visits to the Soviet Union. Practically at all of these meetings mutual understanding was reached on the need to continue detente and co-operation in Europe.

Thus, despite the actions launched across the ocean to complicate international relations, detente continues in Europe; in recent years there has been active co-operation between the socialist community countries including the USSR and the European capitalist countries. Bilateral political exchanges and consultations are held regularly. Implementation of the accords reached at the Belgrade Meeting is under way and preparations are being made for the next European forum which will take place in Madrid.

The attitude of the United States towards detente in Europe remains ambiguous. Washington continues to pursue a double-faced policy. On the one hand, it issues statements about US commitment to detente while on the other hand it intensifies the arms race, conducts an utterly unrealistic policy of "detente from the position of strength", and continues its crude attempts to bring pressure to bear on the socialist countries.

It should be borne in mind, however, that there are fairly influential forces in the United States (including Senators, Congressmen and big industrialists) who oppose a return to the cold war and the aggravation of US-Soviet relations.

Although opinions in the United States vary widely with regard to detente and the policy towards the USSR, the debate around these questions is acute and taking place in circumstances that are very different from those that existed before the positive turn in Soviet-US relations in the early 1970s. Speaking before US Congressmen, Boris Ponomaryov, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, noted that the USSR and the USA had signed 61 documents since 1972, including treaties, agreements, conventions, joint statements, communiques, and memorandums on accords reached, etc. Despite the uneven development of relations between the two countries in recent years, these documents are still in force and can and should be used to promote normal bilateral relations.

The US leadership cannot but take into account public opinion in the country which is in favour of detente and co-operation with the Soviet Union. This is indicated by recent Harris and Gallup polls.

It is clear, however, that it takes efforts from both

sides to maintain and promote normal relations. Attempts to pressure partners, to put forward unjustified "claims" or undermine agreements reached earlier are incompatible with such relations.

But the present US administration is resorting precisely to such methods. Thus, for instance, the US President has asked Congress to postpone consideration of the SALT-2 Treaty, restrict grain sales under the US-Soviet contracts and curtail economic, scientific, technological and cultural ties with the USSR. The USA has used the events in Afghanistan and Soviet assistance to Afghanistan given in accordance with the latter's request and with the relevant bilateral treaty as a pretext for taking this new step towards worsening US-Soviet relations. The position of the US leadership on the Afghanistan question reflects a hostile attitude towards the cause of peace an utter disregard for the basic, long-term interests of detente.

The well-known TASS statement issued in this connection throws light on the real motives behind the US action. It points out that the Soviet side never tried to force trade, economic or cultural ties on the United States, that such ties are a two-way thing. And if the White House intends to influence Soviet policy by resorting to "threats", it will not succeed. Such attempts had failed in the past and will fail in the future as well.

The Soviet people would like to hope that a realistic and far-sighted approach towards Soviet-US relations, including efforts to preserve peace, will get the upper hand in the United States in the long run.

DISARMAMENT: KEY FACTOR OF DETENTE

"For all the significance of this or that problem there is no more important task at present than that of achieving real disarmament; this is a task that concerns the destiny of every person on earth," said Leonid Brezhnev. "The main problem now is to stop the arms race, to ensure progress toward reducing and eventually removing the threat of a thermonuclear disaster. It is here, in this direction that the basic question — the question of how the world situation will develop further — is decided..."

If we consider this meaningful statement which expresses the essence of the position of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist community against the background of the latest militarist steps taken by the US and NATO leadership, we cannot but notice the basically different approach of socialism and imperialism to the key problem of present-day international relations. This problem is of such fundamental and long-term importance and so greatly affects man's use of his material and spiritual resources that it deserves more detailed treatment.

Since the start of the 20th century the world's nations have spent an astronomical sum — more than 8 trillion dollars — on the arms race. Of this sum over 6 trillion have been spent in the years after World War II. According to Western estimates, at present the armies of all countries taken together have at their disposal 124 thousand tanks, 35 thousand combat aircraft and 12,400 naval ships. World nuclear weapons stockpiles today are immense. According to figures cited by the UN Secretary General, in destructive power these stockpiles are equivalent to more than 1,300 thousand bombs of the type dropped by the United States on Hiroshima or 50,000 million tons of TNT, that is, more than 10 tons of explosives for every man, woman and child.

Meanwhile, the arms race goes on. In 1960 world military expenditures came to 130,000 million dollars, in 1970, to 209,000 million dollars and in 1978,

to 400,000 million which means that the world was spending a million dollars a minute on arms.

International arms trade has assumed tremendous proportions. Its volume has increased more than a hundredfold as compared with 1952. The United States has exported arms worth 100 thousand million dollars since 1945.

Militarism and the arms race divert huge manpower resources from socially useful labour. According to estimates of UN experts, the armed forces of all countries currently consist of about 26 million men and the total number of people involved in military-oriented activities, including those who work in the munitions industry, runs into 60 million. This is equal to the number of workers in the manufacturing industry of the whole of Europe (excluding the USSR). Nearly 25 per cent of the world's scientists are engaged in work linked with military purposes.

All this has a direct bearing on Europe. It is in Europe that the biggest armies confront each other. It is Europe that has the biggest concentration of the most modern weapons. Eight thousand US nuclear warheads and 3 thousand means of their delivery are deployed in Western Europe. The yield of tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe exceeds dozens of times the explosive power of the arms used during the six years of World War II. Over the past decade the NATO countries have spent about 1.5 trillion dollars for military purposes, more than half of that sum being spent in the last four years.

The USA pursues a dangerous policy of building up its armed forces and armaments in Europe. Its forces in this part of the world, which totalled 300 thousand men in 1976, were increased by many thousands in 1978.

Under these circumstances the Soviet Union and the

other member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization are compelled to take steps to keep their defences at a necessary level and maintain armies as powerful as the NATO forces.

The countries that participated in the European Conference account for about three quarters of the world's military spending and for the vast majority of the most modern weapons, including nuclear missiles. It is hard to imagine what will happen if a spark should set off an explosion of this atomic powder keg into which the European continent has been turned through the fault of imperialism.

The Soviet Union considers ending the arms race and achieving disarmament to be the main task of mankind. Lenin said that "disarmament is the ideal of socialism".

The USSR's profound concern for peace is expressed in concrete actions. It has put forward more than a hundred proposals in postwar years aimed at ending the arms race, achieving disarmament and strengthening international security. The Soviet approach to the problem is of a comprehensive, all-embracing nature. The Soviet Union's ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament, destruction of the existing arms stockpiles, an end to the manufacture of armaments, and disbandment of all armed forces.

However, we are realists. We understand that it will take much time and effort to achieve this goal. Thus, while calling for the most radical steps, the Soviet Union at the same time seeks opportunities to carry out partial, intermediate measures.

This approach has already helped curb the arms race in a number of areas. More than 20 bilateral and multilateral agreements have been concluded making it possible to stop the spread of mass destruction weapons in some instances and to limit their spread in

others. Cases in point are the treaties banning tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water (1963), their placement in outer space (1967), their proliferation (1968) and their emplacement on the seabed and the ocean floor (1972), the convention banning bacteriological (biological) weapons (1972) and the convention banning the modification of the environment for military or any other hostile purposes (1977). The Soviet-US treaties to limit strategic offensive arms occupy an especially important place in this list of agreements.

However, these agreements, significant as they are, have not led to an actual reduction of the arms stockpiles. On the contrary, in the last few years the USA and NATO have been intensifying the arms race. The neutron bomb, a new type of nuclear weapons, has been developed. And new means of delivering nuclear arms are being mass-produced.

The Soviet Union considers that the European Conference was to stimulate activities aimed at achieving disarmament. And it has shown a good example in this respect.

After the Helsinki Conference the Soviet Union has submitted proposals at the United Nations on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon tests and a simultaneous halt of their production by all states, and on banning the development and manufacture of new types of mass destruction weapons and new systems of such weapons. The USSR proposed that a World Treaty on the Non-Use of Force in International Relations be concluded and submitted drafts of a number of documents including a Declaration on Deepening and Strengthening Detente and a Resolution on Preventing the Danger of Nuclear War, which were later adopted.

The Soviet Union put forward a vast programme of

steps to end the arms race at the special General Assembly session on disarmament in May-June 1978. Many of the Soviet proposals were reflected in the Final Document of that representative forum.

Military detente in Europe is a matter of special concern to the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries. It is apparent that any further arms build-up in Europe and the confrontation to which this leads, jeopardize efforts to deepen detente on the continent which cannot develop parallel with the arms race all the time.

Proceeding from this realization, and in keeping with the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, put forward a programme of measures aimed at achieving military detente in Europe step by step.

In 1976 the Warsaw Treaty countries appealed to all the signatories of the Final Act to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against one another. Other concrete proposals to strengthen security in Europe have also been advanced. These include the proposal to suspend simultaneously Article 9 of the Warsaw Treaty and Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty which allow an increase in the number of participants through accession of states.

The main points of the Soviet programme are set out in the already-mentioned plan of action to consolidate military detente in Europe which was outlined by Leonid Brezhnev in his speech in October 1977 and submitted to the Belgrade Meeting as an official document at the same time.

Subsequently the Soviet programme for military detente in Europe was further developed and concretized. For example, the proposal that the participating countries pledge themselves not to be the first to use nuclear arms against one another was supplemented by

another important proposal: not to be the first to use conventional arms. The Soviet Union, acting in a spirit of constructive compromise, took into account the opinion sometimes voiced in the West that the Warsaw Treaty countries enjoy superiority in conventional weaponry. If the new Soviet proposal were accepted, it would be tantamount to concluding a non-aggression pact between the participants in the European Conference. That would greatly improve the situation in Europe and promote the security of all nations.

A new, extremely important series of measures for achieving military detente in Europe was outlined by Leonid Brezhnev in his speech in Berlin in October 1979 at a meeting to mark the 30th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic.

The proposals advanced by Leonid Brezhnev on behalf of the Soviet Union and the other socialist community countries may be regarded as a *programme for strengthening peace in Europe*. It proceeds from the belief that it is necessary to continue detente, to deepen it and to supplement it with military detente. It covers the main aspects of military detente on the European continent: a reduction of nuclear arms and conventional weapons, and confidence-building measures.

First, this programme shows an effective way of reducing the quantity of nuclear weapons on European soil. In his Berlin speech Leonid Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union as a gesture of good will was ready to reduce unilaterally the number of medium-range nuclear weapons now deployed in the USSR western regions if no more similar nuclear weapons were deployed in Western Europe. The Soviet Union thus expressed its readiness to take a step of major military and political significance in order to prevent another round in the arms race. At the same time Leonid Brezhnev proposed that talks on reducing medium-range nuclear weapons in Europe be started immediately.

It goes without saying that earlier Soviet proposals on the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of Soviet and US warships capable of carrying nuclear arms still stand. The USSR has also reaffirmed its support for the Finnish President's plan to turn Northern Europe into a nuclear-free zone.

Secondly, the Soviet programme for Europe in no way contradicts the proposals advanced by the Warsaw Treaty countries calling on all signatories of the Helsinki Final Act to refrain from being the first to use either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons against one another. The Soviet Union, for its part, has clearly stated that it will never use nuclear weapons against states which undertake not to produce or acquire such weapons or to have them on their territory. The USSR is ready to formalize appropriate commitments with all interested countries.

Thirdly, the Soviet programme for Europe provides for a reduction of conventional arms. Speaking in Berlin Leonid Brezhnev announced the Soviet Union's decision to reduce unilaterally the number of its troops stationed in Central Europe and within a year to withdraw 20 thousand troops from the German Democratic Republic, a thousand tanks and a certain amount of other military equipment. In taking the step the Soviet Union was guided by a sincere desire to achieve some progress in the cause of military detente in Europe and to show an example of replacing mere words with practical action. The step was taken with the agreement of the GDR leadership and after consultations with the other Warsaw Treaty countries.

In his Berlin speech Leonid Brezhnev also urged a further broadening of the confidence-building measures envisaged in the Helsinki Final Act. This is

the *fourth* major point of the Soviet programme for military detente in Europe. It calls for agreement on advance notification of large-scale exercises of land forces — three months instead of three weeks in advance — and starting not from the level of 25 thousand, as has hitherto been the case, but a lower level, say, of 20 thousand troops. The Soviet Union is also prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, not to hold military exercises involving more than 40 or 50 thousand troops.

The socialist countries also stand by their proposals on notification of large-scale air and naval manoeuvres held close to the territorial waters of other countries participating in the European Conference.

They have addressed yet another proposal to the West calling for advance notification by each side not only of military exercises but also of movements of land forces numbering more than 20 thousand men in the zone specified in the Final Act.

Leonid Brezhnev said that other ideas on building confidence among states and reducing the danger of war in Europe could also be discussed. The Soviet Union, as before, believes that discussions of a broad complex of measures for military detente in Europe could best take place at a European Conference held at a political level. Preparations for and the convening of such a conference should be considered a top-priority task.

These important proposals were put forward by the Soviet Union at a time which many regarded as critical for the future of European detente, when the question was decided whether Europe would begin to reduce armaments or whether a new, extremely dangerous round of the arms race would be imposed on it.

So what was the response of NATO top circles to the Soviet initiative? Under pressure from Washington

they adopted a decision in December 1979 to deploy about 600 US cruise and *Pershing-2* ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads in Federal Germany, Britain and Italy, targeted at the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries. At the same time the US Government announced an unprecedented programme of building up all types of armaments for many years to come.

These steps betrayed a great-power disregard of the will of the nations for peace and disarmament, of the vital interests of Europe which is being drawn into an extremely dangerous militarist venture.

However, the latest attempt to talk with the Soviet Union from a position of strength, like all similar attempts in the past, is doomed to failure. Naturally, the Soviet Union will not allow the NATO aggressive bloc to achieve military superiority over the Warsaw Treaty countries. These countries are compelled to provide for their security and they will do so. But this does not mean, of course, that the USSR stands for "war brinkmanship," toward which the Western militarists are pushing the world's nations. The Soviet Union continues to regard as its main task the struggle for a lasting peace, detente and an end to the arms race. With this in view it has put forward a new proposal, namely, that the talks on medium-range missiles should include the question of the US forward deployment weapons and that implementation of possible agreements in this field should be started after the SALT-2 treaty enters into force.

The new Soviet initiatives are designed to break the stalemate over the long-drawn-out Vienna talks which began in October 1973 on reduction of troops and armaments in Central Europe. At these talks the NATO countries have repeatedly rejected a construct-

ive approach, resorting to the tactics of procrastination in an attempt to get concessions from the socialist countries and to gain unilateral advantages. Obviously no progress at the talks is possible on such a basis.

To get military detente under way in Europe at last, the socialist countries put forward a concrete programme in late 1979 on the preparations for and the convening of a conference on this subject and on disarmament in Europe. A proposal to call such a conference at a political level was advanced by the Warsaw Treaty countries in Budapest on May 15, 1978. It was concretized at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Berlin in early December 1979.

What are the issues the socialist countries want to put on the conference agenda? What steps do they recommend to ensure its success?

The conference could discuss confidence-building measures in Europe and steps to reduce troops and armaments on the continent.

It would be advisable to discuss the relevant matters stage by stage starting with modest steps and advancing towards large-scale measures. There should be continuity between the stages of the conference in its work on confidence-building, lowering the level of military confrontation, reducing troops and armaments and other disarmament measures.

At the first stage it would be expedient to focus attention on confidence-building measures. The conference could discuss the proposals of the socialist countries mentioned earlier concerning advance notification of major military exercises on land and of major naval exercises.

The socialist countries, members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, stated their readiness, together with the other participants in the European Conference, to reach agreement on the procedure and order of discussion of concrete measures to reduce military confrontation and achieve disarmament at the appropriate stages of the future conference.

In the view of the participants in the Foreign Ministers Committee meeting in Berlin in December 1979, measures on military detente and disarmament would be the more effective the more closely they were linked to political and legal steps to reduce the danger of war and strengthen the guarantees of the security of states. This is also the objective of the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposals that the participants in the European Conference conclude a treaty on not being the first to use either nuclear or conventional weapons against one another, and that the Warsaw Treaty Organization and NATO undertake not to increase their respective memberships. The Warsaw Treaty countries also point out that they remain ready to disband the Warsaw Treaty Organization at the same time with NATO and to dissolve their military organization if NATO will do likewise as the first step.

Thus, the socialist countries have put forward a concrete and realistic programme of preparing for and holding a conference on military detente and disarmament in Europe. The conference may become a vital factor in the European process started by the meeting in Helsinki. Its success would be a major contribution to fulfilling the task set by the Final Act: to make detente an uninterrupted and ever more viable process.

Practical preparations for the conference should be conducted, in the view of the socialist countries, in conjunction with other measures which form part of the European process, such as the forthcoming Madrid meeting.

Matters connected with preparations for the con-

ference could be discussed during bilateral and miltilateral cosultations among the participants in the European Conference. It would be advisable to call a multilateral preparatory working meeting some time in the first half of 1980. The Madrid meeting could then consider recommendations of the working meeting on the main problems of organizing the conference, including the agenda, and adopt final decisions on the convening of the conference and its procedure.

All these proposals put forward by the socialist countries are part of European political life. Despite complications in the military field brought about in recent months through the fault of the USA and NATO, the Western powers are duty-bound to reply to these important proposals because their implementation would largely determine the international situation.

To sum up, it should be said once again that progress or lack of it in the field of military detente and curbing the arms race will determine international relations in Europe, and not only in Europe, in the 1980s. The present moment is a most crucial one. "Further detente in Europe," said Leonid Brezhnev, "largely depends on how matters will proceed in resolving urgent questions of detente in the military sphere. It can even be said that we have reached the point where the process of political detente should merge with the process of military detente. This is why the most important thing now is to take practical steps to restrain the arms race, to curb this race."

CONCLUSION. TOWARDS THE MADRID MEETING

As the date for the next meeting of 33 European nations, the USA and Canada draws near, the question is more and more often asked as to what role it will play in detente in Europe and in the world, and what position its participants will take at the meeting.

The position of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is well known. It has been set out during meetings between Leonid Brezhnev and the leaders of fraternal socialist states and Communist Parties and in documents of multilateral meetings of the socialist community countries. A full statement of it can be found in the communiques issued after the meetings of the Warsaw Treaty Foreign Ministers Committee held in Moscow in May 1979 and in Berlin in December 1979. Both meetings reaffirmed the view of the socialist countries that the Madrid meeting of 1980 should consolidate and deepen detente, security and co-operation on the continent. The Warsaw Treaty countries are ready to contribute to the success of the meeting.

At its Moscow meeting the Committee said that the conference in Madrid should help make the European dialogue more meaningful and give a fresh impetus to carrying out the Helsinki Final Act.

On the whole conditions exist for making the Madrid meeting a forum serving the cause of security

and co-operation. Despite the difficulties that have arisen owing to Washington's actions, detente in Europe has been preserved in the main and the factors which made the Helsinki Conference in 1975 possible still exist

As Leonid Brezhnev said in early 1980: "Much that is of a constructive nature can be done to strengthen peace in Europe in the near future, in particular, in connection with the forthcoming meeting in Madrid and the Warsaw Treaty countries' proposal for holding a conference on military detente and disarmament. We are resolute in our desire to consolidate and multiply everything positive that has been achieved over the years on the European continent through the collective efforts of the states, big and small." The nations of Europe, the basic interests of which are inseparably linked with detente, are determined to work toward the same end.

Author's Note

When this booklet was ready for the printing press an important event took place in international affairs: the Conference of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee (held in Warsaw, May 14th and 15th, 1980) adopted documents which drew the attention of the public at large and gave a fresh impetus to the peoples' efforts to improve international relations in the 1980's.

The Conference Declaration analyses world events during the 25 years of the Warsaw Treaty's existence, assesses the outstanding part the alliance has played in preserving peace on the European continent and shows how, owing to actions taken by aggressive imperialist circles, the international situation has worsened over the last few years. However, as the participants in the

Conference emphasised, despite this it is possible and necessary to preserve peace and to continue the policy of detente.

The Conference outlined an extensive and realistic programme of priorities which summed up the numerous constructive proposals put forward by the socialist countries in recent years. They are as follows:

Firstly, agreement must be reached not to increase, as of a certain negotiated date, the number of troops stationed in the region specified in the Final Act.

Secondly, all stipulations of the Final Act and, above all, the principles of inter-state relations outlined in it must be strictly observed.

Thirdly, in order that the Madrid Meeting should be successful, preparations for it must be intensified and the still unsettled practical measures concerning the further implementation of the accords of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe must be negotiated in good time. Good preparatory work could lay the foundations for the participation of foreign ministers in the Madrid Meeting.

Fourthly, preparations for a conference on detente and disarmament in Europe should be accelerated and questions concerning its first stage should be negotiated in Madrid. The Conference of the Political Consultative Committee supported Poland's proposal to hold this conference in Warsaw.

Fifthly, steps should be taken to reach an early agreement at the current disarmament talks and, along with securing ratification of the SALT-2 treaty, to resume talks on such issues as a complete, general ban on nuclear tests; a ban on radiological weapons; a ban on chemical weapons and liquidation of existing stockpiles; the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states on whose territory nuclear weapons are not deployed; and the non-deployment of such

weapons in states where there are none at present.

Sixthly, talks must be started immediately on such vital problems as the conclusion of a World Non-Aggression Treaty, and ways of putting an end to the manufacture of nuclear weapons and gradual liquidation of present stockpiles, a ban on developing new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and a cut in military budgets, particularly those of the major powers.

Seventhly, measures should be examined to limit and reduce the levels of military presence in certain parts of the world, the oceans, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, etc.

It is obvious that the above proposals encompass literally all the crucial problems complicating present-day international relations, the solution of which could radically improve the world situation.

The Warsaw Conference of the Political Consultative Committee also proposed that a meeting of heads of state of all regions of the world be held in the immediate future to discuss possible ways of eliminating seats of international tension and preventing war. Not everyone may be able to appreciate the meaning of this daring proposal right away, although history has shown that it is precisely authoritative meetings of the kind that can open up a more reliable path to mutual understanding and a more stable peace.

The decisions of the last conference of the Political Consultative Committee, the meetings immediately following it between Leonid Brezhnev and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing in Warsaw, and Andrei Gromyko's conversations in Vienna with the foreign ministers of Great Britain and Italy, the US Secretary of State and with the Chancellor of Austria have inspired millions of people with the hope that the period of acute confrontation, which reached its peak at the beginning of 1980, may be followed by constructive talks in the spirit of detente, that "light may appear at the other end of the tunnel". This is precisely the aim of the socialist countries' foreign policies.

Yuri Kashlev
Europe Five Years After Helsinki

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Yuri Kashlev, a writer on world affairs, has attended many international conferences, including the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Co-operation and the Belgrade Meeting.

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